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Preface
This thesis contains several lines of research conducted during my four years at the Eu-
ropean University Institute. It consists of three chapters that are all in the area of applied
macroeconomics, but are built on distinct ideas.
The first chapter, “How the Removal of Deposit Rate Ceilings Has Changed Monetary
Transmission in the US: Theory and Evidence” is concerned with US monetary history and
the impact of institutional changes in the late 1970s and early 1980s on the monetary trans-
mission mechanism. The chapter presents evidence on a phenomenon of disintermediation
occurring during the major recessions in the 1960s and 1970s, but absent ever since. Using
a novel data set, I show that disintermediation is closely linked to the existence of deposit
rate ceilings that were imposed under regulation Q of the Federal Reserve System. Disin-
termediation potentially has real effects if the resulting shortage of loanable funds forces
banks to cut back on lending to borrowers that rely on intermediated finance. The main
hypothesis of Chapter 1 is that regulation-induced disintermediation affected the monetary
transmission mechanism during the 1960s and 1970s and provided the Federal Reserve with
greater leverage over real activity than afterwards. In a monetary DSGE model that incor-
porates deposit rate ceilings as occasionally binding constraints, I show how the regulation
alters the behavior of money aggregates and exacerbates the drop in economic activity fol-
lowing a monetary tightening. The results of a threshold VAR lend support to the main
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theoretical predictions of the model. This chapter contributes to establishing the existence
and nature of changes in the conduct and transmission of monetary policy since the mid
1980s, which is key in understanding the remarkable macroeconomic performance of the
US since then.
Chapter 2, titled “The Role of Expectations in Sudden Stops”, studies the abrupt declines
in capital inflows, usually accompanied by depression-sized, but short-lived, contractions
in economic activity, that have plagued so many countries in the last 25 years. It pro-
poses a new framework for the analysis of these “Sudden Stops” and applies it to the case
of the Korean Crisis in 1998. The chapter presents a flexible-price small open economy
model that faces a “peso problem” in productivity states. Agents rationally adjust their
beliefs about future productivity growth after the arrival of news. A downward revision
of expectations triggers a Sudden Stop, together with large declines in GDP, employment,
consumption and investment. One of the distinctive features of the model is that there need
not be any actual change in productivity growth to generate large fluctuations. Quantita-
tively, the model goes a long way in matching the 1998 Korean Crisis and subsequent swift
recovery by considering a sudden deterioration of expectations about the future.
The last chapter, “Business Cycle Analysis and VARMA Models”, is joint work with
Christian Kascha and is more methodological in nature. We address the question whether
long-run identified Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVARs), which are a popular tool in
applied macroeconomics, can in practice discriminate between competing models. Some
authors have recently suggested that SVARs may fail to do so partly because they are finite-
order approximations to infinite-order stochastic processes. We estimate VARMA and state
space models, which are not misspecified, using simulated data and compare true with
estimated impulse responses of hours worked to a technology shock. We find little gain
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from using VARMA models. However, state space models do outperform SVARs. In
particular, subspace methods consistently yield lower mean squared errors, although even
these estimates remain too imprecise for reliable inference. Our findings indicate that long-
run identified SVARs perform weakly because of small sample problems, not because of
the finite-order approximation.
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Chapter 1
How the Removal of Deposit Rate
Ceilings Has Changed Monetary
Transmission in the US: Theory and
Evidence
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1.1 Introduction
Output and inflation volatility in the US have dropped considerably since the early 1980s,
which suggests a fundamental change in the dynamics of the economy.1 So far, no con-
sensus has emerged on the fundamental causes of this Great Moderation. Many, such as
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2005), focus on shifts in
monetary policymaking, arguing that the Federal Reserve has become more successful in
fighting inflation and stabilizing economic activity. Others, such as Bernanke and Mihov
(1998) and Sims and Zha (2006), find little evidence for a break in the conduct of mone-
tary policy. The focus of this paper is on one aspect of monetary policymaking for which
structural change is a historical fact: Regulatory deposit rate ceilings and their removal in
the early 1980s.
After the banking collapse of the 1930s, US legislators imposed a regulatory structure
on the US banking sector aimed at restoring financial stability. The Banking Act of 1933
introduced regulation Q of the Federal Reserve, prohibiting interest payments on demand
deposits and imposing interest rate ceilings on time and savings deposits at commercial
banks. The purpose of the regulation was to shelter banks from excessive competition,
discourage risky investment policies and prevent future bank failures. Most of the ceilings
were phased out between 1980 and 1986.
This paper provides evidence, based on data constructed from historical Federal Re-
serve releases, that binding deposit rate ceilings gave rise to a phenomenon of “disinterme-
diation”: Unable to raise deposit rates above the legal ceilings, banks could not compete
effectively with market instruments and failed to manage their liabilities in the same way as
without binding regulations. Disintermediation potentially has real effects if the resulting
shortage of loanable funds forces banks to cut back on lending to borrowers that rely on
1The evidence on the Great Moderation is discussed by Kim and Nelson (1999), as well as McConnell
and Perez-Quiros (2000) and Blanchard and Simon (2001).
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intermediated finance. In that case, regulation Q affects the monetary transmission mecha-
nism and provides the Federal Reserve with greater leverage over real activity. The Fed’s
tighter control over bank liabilities with binding ceilings may even have contributed to
business cycle volatility during the 1960s and 1970s. This hypothesis deserves attention,
since in contrast with the post-1980 years, every recession during this period is associated
with outflows in all deposit categories at US banks.
To formalize the argument, I construct a theoretical DSGE model that incorporates oc-
casionally binding interest rate ceiling constraints and solve it numerically. Attention is
restricted to monetary policy innovations and I compute impulse responses to an unan-
ticipated decrease in money supply growth with and without a binding constraint. With
binding regulation, the same decrease in money growth produces a larger drop in output.
The model has several implications regarding the relevance of a regulation-induced disin-
termediation channel of monetary transmission in US data: In the presence of a binding
ceiling, the spread between market interest rates and the ceiling widens; interest-bearing
bank liabilities are constrained; the liquidity effect of a monetary tightening is larger; non-
interest bearing money holdings respond little to interest rate increases; the contraction in
lending to firms is more severe and inventories-to-sales ratios are lower.
I confront the theoretical predictions with the data by estimating a structural VAR that
allows for regime shifts in the autoregressive coefficients. The empirical model captures
the nonlinearities of binding deposit rate ceilings by exploiting information contained in
the spread between market interest rates and the regulatory ceilings. In response to an
identified positive innovation in the Federal Funds rate, binding ceilings exacerbate the
contraction in output. Moreover, the response of the spread, the monetary aggregates and
real lending are consistent with the theoretical predictions. These findings lend support
for a structural change in the monetary transmission mechanism since the early 1980s that
is due to the disappearance of regulation-induced disintermediation effects. The results
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also imply a role for regulation Q in shaping macroeconomic outcomes during the 1960s
and 1970s in the US. A counterfactual experiment, in which the effects of regulation Q
are removed from the 1960s-1970s data, accounts for over half of the reduction in output
volatility since the early 1980s.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents evidence of the disin-
termediation phenomenon during the 1960s and 1970s; Section 1.3 describes the monetary
DSGE model and its quantitative properties; Section 1.4 lays out the empirical strategy,
and discusses the estimated impulse responses and the counterfactual experiment; Section
1.5 concludes.
1.2 Disintermediation and Deposit Rate Ceilings
Regulation-induced disintermediation occurs when depository institutions experience drops
in deposit inflows because legal ceilings prevent the payment of the higher interest rates
offered on market instruments. This phenomenon was described by, for instance, Fried-
man (1970) as well as Ruebling (1970), Cook (1978) and Gilbert and Lovati (1979). In
this paper, I distinguish two major components of the liability side of depository institu-
tions’ balance sheets: Core deposits, consisting of all checkable and savings deposits; and
managed liabilities, which are defined as the sum of small and large denomination time
deposits, dollar-denominated deposits issued by foreign banks (also known as eurodollar
deposits), and security repurchase agreements. Core deposits have traditionally been, and
still are, quite interest-sensitive, with rising interest rates leading to outflows as agents sub-
stitute towards higher yielding alternatives. By varying the rate of interest offered on other
types of deposits, banks can control the total deposit inflow and “manage” their liabilities.
To the extent that investors substitute towards these alternatives, banks are able to maintain
the pool of loanable funds. The larger the spread between rates on alternative saving in-
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struments and the rates offered by depository institutions, the bigger the opportunity cost of
holding deposits. If regulations constrain interest rates paid on managed liabilities, banks,
not being able to offer competitive yields, may fail to offset losses in core deposits. The
disintermediation effect occurs when, for these reasons, binding regulatory ceilings cause
slowing or negative growth in all deposit categories.
Figure 1.1 plots real growth of core deposits and managed liabilities at US depository
institutions from 1960 to 2005. From the late 1970s onwards, there is a negative correlation
between the two series, which suggests that banks have successfully counteracted losses in
core deposits. Before, however, the picture is quite different: Every NBER-dated recession
is associated with slowing or negative growth in both core deposits and managed liabilities.
If this fact is to be explained by a regulation-induced disintermediation effect, it needs to
be the case that the ceilings constituted binding constraints at those instances. Note for
example that there is one early episode (1966 and early 1967) of negative growth in core
deposits during which banks were able to expand their use of managed liabilities. To iden-
tify the periods in which regulation Q was binding, I constructed a monthly data set from
historical issues of the Federal Reserve’s Annual Statistical Digest.2 I refer the interested
reader to the Appendix for more detail on the regulatory adjustments and financial market
innovations that have influenced deposit rate regulation over time.
Core Deposits. Figure 1.2 plots real growth of core deposits against the difference be-
tween the 3-month T-bill rate and the ceiling on savings deposits from 1960 until the re-
moval in 1986. The Figure shows a stable negative relationship between the spread and
deposit growth. It also reveals how on each occasion up to 1983, a positive spread is asso-
ciated with drops in core deposit growth. In fact, every NBER-dated recession is associated
2The Annual Statistical Digest is published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
and documents ceiling adjustments on the various types of deposits. A monthly data set is available from the
author.
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with troughs in core deposit growth and peaks in the ceiling spread. Finally, note that the
large spike in core deposit growth in 1983 is due to the nationwide authorization of a string
of new transaction and savings deposit instruments (including ATS, NOW, Super-NOW
and MMDA accounts). The ceilings on core deposits were lifted in March 1986.
Managed Liabilities. To assess the relevance of deposit rate ceilings on managed lia-
bilities, it is important to first have a look at their composition. Figure 1.3 depicts the
components of managed liabilities as a share of the total. Although steadily declining over
time, small denomination time deposits (STDs) have traditionally constituted the largest
share of managed liabilities. Because of the creation of large negotiable certificates of de-
posit (CDs), by the mid 1960s, the share of large time deposits (LTDs) had risen from 10%
to almost 40% of managed liabilities. After 5 years of subsequent decline, 1970 marked a
turning point, after which the share of LTDs has remained relatively stable at about 25%,
until recently climbing back up to 40%. The volumes of Eurodollar deposits and Repur-
chase Agreements have historically remained relatively small compared to the volume of
time deposits.
Although usually higher than those for savings deposits, maximum rates also applied
to time deposits. Figure 1.4 plots the real growth rate of small and large time deposits,
together with the spreads between the relevant market rates and the ceilings for various
maturities. Real growth in small term deposits, depicted in the left panel of Figure 1.4, was
negative during 1960, when the spread on all maturities was positive. A series of upward
adjustments of the ceilings in 1962, 1963, 1964 and 1965 brought STD rates back in line
with market rates. The revisions initiated an expansion in STDs during the course of 1966
and early 1967. This counteracted the contemporaneous drop in core deposits on which
the ceilings were still binding. In contrast, at the onset of the recessions in 1969-1970 and
1973-1975, market rates exceeding the ceilings had brought about significant reductions in
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STD growth. The authorization of Money Market Certificates and Small Saver Certificates
in 1978 and 1979 explains why the growth in STDs remained relatively stable while interest
rates soared in the early 1980s (see Appendix). In September 1983, the ceilings on small
time deposits were eliminated.
Real growth of LTDs, shown in the right panel of Figure 1.4, also displays evidence
of disintermediation effects. Major ceiling rates adjustments in the first half of the 1960s
ensured that banks could offer competitive rates as the market for LTDs expanded. How-
ever, positive spreads towards the end of the 1960s caused a dramatic fall in the amount of
LTDs outstanding, also explaining the decline in their relative use, evident in Figure 1.3.
The contraction in LTDs outstanding even led to the removal of ceilings for certain smaller
maturities in 1970. In 1973, regulation Q ceilings were lifted on all LTDs.
The analysis of bank liabilities and deposit rate ceilings leads to the following conclu-
sions: First, on multiple occasions, there have been contemporaneous contractions in core
deposits and managed liabilities growth during the 1960s and 1970s. In contrast, after the
late 1970s, the correlation between the growth rates of both deposit categories is consis-
tently negative. Second, the contractions in deposits coincide exactly with periods in which
market rates exceeded the deposit rate ceilings imposed under regulation Q, thus providing
evidence for a regulation-induced disintermediation effect. Third, episodes in which dis-
intermediation appears to have taken place include the periods surrounding the 1960 and
1970 recessions. Also the 1973-1975 recession seems to have been associated with dis-
intermediation, despite the earlier removal of ceilings on large time deposits. Regulatory
changes and innovations in banking explain why the impact of the deposit rate ceilings was
reduced towards the end of the 1970s, even though regulation Q was not formally removed
until the early 1980s.
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1.3 Effects of Disintermediation: A Monetary DSGE Model
If the regulation-induced disintermediation observed in the data forces banks to cut back
on lending to borrowers that depend on intermediated finance, it also potentially exacer-
bates the real effects of a monetary tightening. This section develops a Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium model in which interest rate regulations, incorporated as occasion-
ally binding constraints, alter the transmission of stochastic monetary shocks primarily by
affecting the availability of bank credit: Binding ceilings reduce the demand for deposits
and constrain the pool of loanable funds. The model also incorporates inventory investment
decisions, because the availability of short-term credit directly affects firms’ optimal inven-
tory response to a monetary-induced drop in sales. Since most short-term business credit
consists of bank loans, the disintermediation effect could alter the sensitivity of inventory
investment to cash flow fluctuations and the ability of firms to smooth production.
1.3.1 A Monetary DSGE Model of Deposit Rate Ceilings
The model builds on a money-in-the-utility-function framework. Apart from the regulation
Q price controls and the possibility of inventory investment, the model features a finance
constraint: As in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) or Fuerst (1992), firms must finance
working capital expenses by taking out a bank loan. Furthermore, I assume that prices
are set before the realization of the current shock. This price-setting friction allows for
more realistic effects of monetary shocks on interest rates and real variables. The economy
contains a household sector, a firm sector, a banking sector and a government and the only
source of uncertainty is a shock to the money growth rate.
The Household. The economy is inhabited by an infinitely-lived representative house-
hold that starts every period t = 0, ...,∞ with the economy’s entire last period money stock
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Mt . The household decides to deposit an amount Mt−Qt in a bank and keep Qt as nominal
cash balances. Deposits earn a gross nominal deposit rate Rt .
The specification of household preferences is identical to Christiano and Eichenbaum (2005).
Lifetime utility is
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
log(ct)− Ψ2 h
2
t +
Ω
1−1/φ
(
Qt
Pt
)1− 1φ]
, (1.1)
where E0 is the time 0 conditional expectation operator; ct is the period t value of a con-
sumption index to be defined below; ht is hours worked in period t; and Pt is the period t
consumption-based money price index. The parameters of the utility function are the dis-
count factor, 1> β> 0; the time allocation parameter, Ψ> 0; the utility weight of real cash
balances, Ω > 0; and the interest rate elasticity of the demand for cash, φ > 0.
There is a continuum of differentiated final consumption goods, indexed by j ∈ (0,1), that
enter the household utility function through the index ct , given by
ct =
∫ 1
0
(
n jt
nt
) ξ
ε
s
ε−1
ε
jt d j
 εε−1 .
Here, s jt is the amount of good j purchased by the household for consumption in period t,
whereas n jt denotes the total stock of good j that is available for sale in period t. This spec-
ification of the consumption index implies that, at a given price, finished goods inventories
facilitate sales. This modelling approach is followed by, for instance, Bils and Kahn (2000)
and is also related to models that incorporate inventories as a factor of production, such as
Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Christiano (1988). Note that here, following Jung and
Yun (2006), the stock of good j available in stores generates higher utility for the house-
hold only to the extent it is higher than the economy-wide average level nt =
∫ 1
0 n jtd j. The
parameters of the consumption goods index ct are the elasticity of demand with respect to
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stock available for sales, ξ > 0; and the price elasticity of demand for good j, ε > 1.
Letting Pjt denote the price of good j, intratemporal cost minimization implies the follow-
ing demand function for the j-th good:
s jt =
(
n jt
nt
)ξ(Pjt
Pt
)−ε
ct , (1.2)
where the utility-based price index Pt is given by
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
(
n jt
nt
)ξ
Pjt1−εd j
] 1
1−ε
.
Household assets evolve according to
Mt+1 = Rt(Mt −Qt)+Dt +Wtht +Qt −Ptct . (1.3)
The first term on the right hand side, Rt(Mt−Qt), denotes total interest earnings on deposits
held with the banks. Without loss of generality, asset markets are not modeled explicitly
and Dt simply represents combined period t dividend payments from the household and
banking sector. The third term, Wtht is total labor earnings, where Wt is the period t nom-
inal wage. Finally, Qt are cash balances and Ptct is total consumption expenditure. The
intertemporal decision problem of the household consists of choosing sequences of cash
holdings, consumption levels and labor effort, contingent on the history of realizations of
the shock, in order to maximize lifetime utility as defined in (1.1), subject to the constraint
defined in (1.3).
The Firms. Each final consumption good j ∈ (0,1) is produced by a monopolistic firm
using labor as the only input. The technology for period t production for each firm j is
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given by
y jt =
 h
α
jt −θ if hαjt ≥ θ
0 otherwise
, (1.4)
where θ > 0 is a fixed cost of production and 1 > α > 0 and h jt is labor input by firm j.
There is no entry or exit in the market for good j. Each firm’s stock of goods available for
sale in period t is
n jt = n jt−1− s jt−1+ y jt , (1.5)
where s jt−1 are period t−1 sales of good j.
It is assumed that workers must be paid in advance and that firms must borrow the wage bill
by lending L jt from a bank. As a result, each firm j faces a financing constraint Wth jt ≤ L jt .
Loans are repaid at the end of the period at the gross interest rate rt . Firms set prices in
period t before the current realization of the shock and treat Vt , the marginal value of one
unit of cash to the household in period t, as exogenous. Noting that, as long as rt > 1, the
financing constraint holds with equality, the objective of each firm j is to choose sequences
of prices and production levels contingent on the realization of uncertainty in order to
maximize
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βtVt
[
Pjts jt − rtWth jt
]
,
taking into account the demand function for its differentiated final consumption good, given
by (1.2), and subject to (1.4) and (1.5).
The Banks. The representative bank collects deposits Mt −Qt and receives Xt as a cash
injection from the government. Hence, bank lending is restricted by the availability of
funds as follows
Lt ≤Mt −Qt +Xt .
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The market for business loans is competitive and as long as rt ≥ Rt > 1, the intermediary
lends all the available funds to the firms. Government regulation stipulates the following
restriction on interest rates paid on deposits:
Rt ≤ Rq ,
where Rq > 1 is an exogenous deposit rate ceiling. This inequality captures regulation Q
in a simple and straightforward manner. The banks’ net cash position at the end of each
period t is distributed as dividends to the household, the ultimate owner of the banks. Entry
and exit in the banking sector is ruled out.
The Government. The money stock evolves according to Mt+1 = Mt +Xt . Define µt ≡
Mt+1/Mt as the growth rate of money in period t, which evolves according to the univariate
stochastic process
ln(µt) = (1−ρ) ln(µ)+ρ ln(µt−1)+χt , (1.6)
where µ > 1 is the average gross growth rate of the money stock, 1 > ρ > 0 measures
the persistence and χt is a normal i.i.d. random variable with mean zero and variance
σ2 > 0. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) provide arguments in favor of this
simple representation of monetary policy for evaluating the effect of monetary shocks in
theoretical models.
Market Clearing and Equilibrium. An equilibrium is a set of sequences of prices and
quantities such that all agents maximize their objective functions and goods, labor and asset
markets clear. The Appendix provides a more detailed equilibrium definition.
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Note that loan market clearing implies that
Wtht = Mt+1−Qt . (1.7)
Competition in the market for loans ensures that Rt = rt as long as the regulation Q-
constraint is not binding. Else, in the case where the interest rate constraint binds, it must
be the case that rt > Rt = Rq.
1.3.2 Parametrization and Numerical Solution Methodology
Parametrization. Following standard practice, I choose parameter values to obtain cer-
tain properties of the steady state of a non-stochastic version of the model. All the values
used for generating the results are summarized in Table 1.1. The time period in the model
corresponds to one quarter. The parameters can be partitioned into three groups. The first
group contains the household’s preference parameters, namely β, Ψ, Ω, φ, ε and ξ. The
discount factor is β = 1.03−0.25, implying an annualized real interest rate of 3% in the
non-stochastic steady state. The value for the time allocation parameter Ψ normalizes the
steady-state value of hours worked h to unity. The value for the utility weight Ω yields a
ratio of cash balances to the total money stock Q/M equal to 0.3. The interest rate elastic-
ity of money demand φ is 0.24. Obtaining reliable estimates for this parameter is difficult
because of structural changes in financial markets. I take the value estimated by Teles and
Zhou (2005), who use a relatively stable monetary aggregate, MZM, and a more accu-
rate measure of the opportunity cost. The value of 0.24 is higher than the one estimated
by Christiano and Eichenbaum (2005) but lower than those obtained by Lucas (1988) and
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000). Next, the value of the price elasticity of demand ε
yields a steady state non-competitive markup of 20% (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1995).
Finally, the value for ξ matches the average inventories-to-sales ratio in manufacturing and
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trade in US postwar data. The second group contains the technology parameters, θ and
α. The choice of α = 0.64 corresponds to the labor income share in the data and the fixed
cost θ is set to ensure that firms make zero excess profits in the non-stochastic steady state.
The third group are the parameters governing the money growth process. I borrow these
values from Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992): The average quarterly gross growth rate is
µ= 1.012, the autoregressive parameter ρ is 0.3 and the standard deviation of the monetary
shock is σ = 0.012.
Numerical Solution Methodology. I compute the model solution by solving the system
of Euler equations describing the equilibrium behavior of the various macroeconomic vari-
ables, which is given in the Appendix. The numerical method is based on time iteration,
as described by Coleman (1990). The main advantages of the procedure are its straightfor-
ward application to non-Pareto optimal economies and the fact that convergence is usually
achieved. Time iteration also does not rely on discretization of the state space, but instead
requires interpolation techniques that preserve the continuous nature of the state space. In
addition, as showed by Rendahl (2006), time iteration is relatively easily to implement in
the presence of inequality constraints.3 However, time iteration is generally slow. There-
fore the iterative scheme is augmented by the application of the method of endogenous
gridpoints, developed by Carrol (2006). This method reduces the number of nonlinear
equations that need to be solved numerically in every iteration.
The model features two endogenous state variables, nt and pt , and one exogenous state χt .
All functions are approximated by a linear interpolation scheme based on a grid of the state
space. The grid contains 20 nodes for both endogenous state variables, and 9 nodes for the
shock. Taking expectations requires integration over the continuous state space. The inte-
grals with respect to the normal density are approximated using Gauss-Hermite quadrature
3In fact, Rendahl (2006) proves numerical convergence for the case of Pareto optimal economies.
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with 10 quadrature nodes (Judd, 1998).
1.3.3 Quantitative Properties of the Model
Figure 1.5 plots the response of some of the main variables to a one-standard-deviation
(1.2%) unexpected decrease in the money growth rate in period t = 1. The solid line rep-
resents the model without deposit rate ceiling (Rq is set arbitrarily high), the striped line
represents the model with a ceiling Rq of 1.02. The response of the net interest rate rt −1,
inflation Pt/Pt−1 and the interest rate-ceiling spread rt −Rq are in levels, whereas those for
production yt , the inventories-to-sales ratio (nt − ct)/ct , real lending Lt/Pt , real cash bal-
ances Qt/Pt and real deposits (Mt −Qt)/Pt are all in percentage deviations from the state
prior to the shock. This initial state, at t = 0, is the one to which the economy converges
when the value of the exogenous shock is set to χt = 0 for an arbitrarily long period. Note
that this state does not correspond to the steady state of the non-stochastic version of the
model. For instance, in the absence of a ceiling on the deposit rate, r0 = R0 = 1.0192 is
slightly below its non-stochastic steady-state level of µ/β = 1.0195 because of Jensen’s
inequality. When a ceiling of Rq = 1.02 is imposed, the loan rate is 1.0202, which is higher
than µ/β. This is because, in those states of the world where the ceiling is binding, a higher
loan rate rt is required to clear the market for loanable funds, as the ceiling decreases the
opportunity cost of holding cash and lowers the demand for deposits. For the consumption
Euler equation to hold, interest rates also need to be higher in states of the world where
the ceiling is not binding. The fact that interest rates increase on average with regula-
tion Q is interesting in itself, since one of the motivations during the 1960s and 1970s to
keep the ceilings below the market interest rates was to lower loan rates charged by banks.
In the current setting, this reasoning breaks down. Because of the finance constraint, the
higher interest rates raise the marginal cost of hiring labor and therefore lower output and
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consumption relative to the regulation-free model. Note that for Rq = 1.02, the ceiling is
binding in the initial state. Hence, in simulations, deposit rates are at the ceiling more often
than not, which is the case in 1960s and 1970s data.
In response to a negative money growth shock, both models display a “liquidity effect”,
i.e. interest rates rise after a money tightening. To see why, write the real supply of loanable
funds in the economy as
Lst
Pt
=
Xt
Pt
+
(
Mt
Pt
−
(
Rt −1
Ωct
)−φ)
. (1.8)
Loanable funds come from two sources: The first term in equation (1.8) represents the
exogenous injections by the government, the second term reflects the endogenous supply of
deposits by the households derived from the household’s first order condition with respect
to cash balances. The demand for deposits depends positively on the deposit rate Rt and
negatively on consumption through the equalization of the marginal utilities of holding
cash and consuming. Using the firms’ first order condition for labor, loan demand can be
written as
Ld
Pt
= α
MCt
Pt
yt +θ
rt
. (1.9)
Loan demand depends negatively on the cost of borrowing rt and the markup Pt/MCt and
positively on production yt , all of which determine the size of the real wage bill in equi-
librium. The monetary shock leads to a leftward shift of the loan supply curve through
a decrease in Xt/Pt . Clearing of the loan market is achieved by a reduction in demand
through an increase in rt and decreases in yt and MCt/Pt . In the regulation-free model,
an endogenous reaction of deposit demand through an increase in Rt and a decrease in ct
counteracts the decrease in the supply of funds. The two lower right panels of Figure 1.5
show how households substitute out of cash balances and into interest-bearing deposits.
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Despite this shift into deposits, the net effect for the loan market is a decrease in Lt/Pt and
an increase in the borrowing cost rt . In the model with a binding regulation Q constraint,
there is no first order effect on deposit demand through an increase in Rt . The cash position
of the household changes only through the decrease in ct . This is the model equivalent of
the disintermediation effect of deposit rate ceilings. As a result, a larger part of the ad-
justment must occur through the net effect of the increase in rt and the decreases in yt and
MCt/Pt . The immediate consequence of binding regulation is to alter the relation between
money and interest rates: Disintermediation amplifies the liquidity effect of a monetary
contraction.
In both models, a monetary tightening leads to a fall in hours worked and output: On the
one hand, higher borrowing costs increase the marginal cost of hiring labor, which leads to
a leftward shift of the labor demand curve; on the other hand, the labor supply curve shifts
rightward because of a drop in consumption. Both effects contribute to a decline of the real
wage Wt/Pt . Nevertheless, the net result is a decline in ht , which implies that the marginal
cost of hiring labor, RtWt/MCt has risen. Because borrowing costs rise more, the decline in
output with a binding regulation Q ceiling is more pronounced than for the regulation-free
model.
To understand the response of inventories, it useful to consider the firms’ first order
condition for inventory investment, which in a symmetric equilibrium leads to the following
relation:
Ptξ
ct
nt
+βEt
[
Vt+1
Vt
MCt+1
](
1−ξ ct
nt
)
= MCt . (1.10)
Adding an extra unit to the stock of goods available for sale is associated with a marginal
cost MCt , and yields an increase in sales of ξct/nt , valued at Pt . To the extent the extra unit
adds to inventories and is not sold, production is shifted from t +1 to t, saving the firm the
present discounted value of tomorrow’s marginal production cost MCt+1. For notational
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ease, let zt =MCt/Pt denote the inverse of the markup charged over marginal cost and zet =
βEt [zt+1Pt+1Vt+1/Pt/Vt ] the expected discounted value of next period’s inverse markup.
Using (1.10), the inventories-to-sales ratio can be written as
nt − ct
ct
= ξ
(
1− zet
zt − zet
)
−1 . (1.11)
Note that the inventories-to-sales ratio is increasing in today’s markup, and decreasing in
the expected markup tomorrow. The reason is that, since the return to inventory investment
is largely the ability to boost current sales, firms wish to build up the stock of goods avail-
able for sale at times when profit margins are high. The real marginal cost of producing
one additional good is
zt = rt
Wt
Pt
1
α
(yt +θ)
1−α
α . (1.12)
The drop in yt and Wt/Pt contributes to a decrease in zt , whereas the increase in rt tends
to increase zt . The net effect in both models, however, is a decrease in zt and therefore an
increase in the markup Pt/MCt . In the next period, prices adjust and there is a drop in the
markup. The countercyclical reaction of today’s markup and the lower markup tomorrow
are the reason why firms wish to increase the inventories-to-sales ratio, which is achieved
both through a drop in sales and an increase in the stock of inventories. Because borrowing
costs rise more in the model with regulation Q, the increase in the profit margin is smaller
and the positive response of inventories is reduced relative to the regulation-free model.
Since the shock to monetary growth rate is persistent, in period 2 inflation falls. Whereas
the supply of loanable funds on behalf of the government is still low, equilibrium in the
market for funds is now attained mainly through the drop in prices, even to the extent that,
in real terms, lending increases in period 2. Through the household’s consumption Euler
equation, consumption and therefore sales rise in period 2. Afterwards, as the effect of the
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money shock dies out, consumption reverts to the initial state. Because of the price adjust-
ment, markups today are small relative to those tomorrow, which leads firms to decrease the
stock of inventories relative to sales. Note how, because of the ceiling, the liquidity effect
in the regulation Q model is quite persistent. This additional gradual decline in borrowing
costs further raises next period’s markup relative to today’s, and therefore the inventories-
to-sales ratio is reduced more in the regulation Q model. As markups and sales stabilize,
inventory levels return to the initial state.
The model response to a contractionary monetary shock is qualitatively consistent with
the consensus view: Interest rates rise; aggregate output, employment, the price level and
monetary aggregates fall. Admittedly, the model is too simple to replicate the precise
timing and persistence encountered in the data. Nevertheless, it provides several clear pre-
dictions about the impact of deposit rate ceilings after a contractionary monetary shock.
First and foremost, regulation Q affects the relation between monetary aggregates and real
activity. With binding regulation, the same decrease in the growth rate of the money stock,
measured as Mt , is associated with a larger drop in output. The regulation-induced disinter-
mediation effect provides the monetary authority with greater leverage over loanable funds
and real activity. In order to find evidence for this hypothesis, the following additional facts
should be observed in the data: After an (unexpected) tightening of the monetary stance
that results in rising interest rates and with binding deposit rate ceilings,
1. the spread between market rates and the regulatory ceilings widens, i.e. the monetary
authority does not offset the monetary shock by raising the ceiling;
2. the response of (interest-bearing) bank deposits displays a disintermediation effect,
i.e. the response is constrained relative to the nonbinding case;
3. non-interest bearing money holdings respond little to the interest rate increase;
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4. the contraction in real lending is more severe than otherwise;
5. firms’ inventories-to-sales ratios are lower than otherwise.
If the data support these facts, then there is evidence for a role of ceiling regulations in
the monetary transmission mechanism and in shaping the macroeconomic outcomes of the
1960s and 1970s in the US. It is important to note that these predictions are likely to hold
in more elaborate model settings. It is true that the biggest banks gradually gained access
to unregulated financial markets, mostly abroad and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of
the Fed. It is also true that some of the big firms gained access to nonintermediated (short-
term) funds, such as commercial paper. But as long as these do not account for a sufficiently
large fraction of economic activity, which is all the more realistic for the 1960s and 1970s,
regulation-induced disintermediation is likely to be relevant. Another realistic extension of
the model is to expand the menu of assets available to the households beyond cash and bank
deposits. But as long as the ceiling regulation creates an opportunity cost of holding bank
deposits relative to unregulated alternatives, there will be a disintermediation effect. Also,
to the extent that bank deposits are the closest substitutes for non-interest bearing assets,
their interest rate sensitivity is reduced when the ceilings bind. Finally, the rationing of
bank credit in the model occurs exclusively through the price mechanism, i.e. via increases
in the loan interest rate. It is probable that, instead, some of the adjustment in bank lending
occurs through quantity rationing. However, this would not decrease the relevance of the
disintermediation channel of monetary transmission.
1.4 Confronting the Theory with the Data
To evaluate the theoretical predictions empirically, I estimate impulse responses to an iden-
tified monetary policy innovation in a structural Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR). The
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objective is to compare the impulse responses for two separate regimes: One in which
deposit rate ceilings are binding, the other in which they are not. Implicitly, this means
that the autoregressive coefficients in the VAR must vary across these two regimes. Re-
searchers focussing on regime dependence in monetary VARs have traditionally relied ei-
ther on subsample analysis (Boivin and Giannoni, 2002), threshold VARs (Balke, 2000) or
on Bayesian estimation of regime-switching models (Sims and Zha, 2006). My empirical
strategy is to directly exploit information about the presumed source of regime switching. I
assume that observations on the interest-rate ceiling spreads contain sufficient information
to identify the asymmetric effects of deposit rate regulation. A VAR in which the interest-
rate ceiling spread is a threshold variable and 0 the threshold value is a natural framework
to assess the role of binding ceilings as a nonlinear propagator of monetary policy shocks.
1.4.1 Empirical Framework and Stability Tests
Model Specification. Let yt be a (n× 1) vector of time series including a price index
PIt ; a commodity price index Pcomt ; a measure of economic activity Yt ; the Federal Funds
rate FFt ; and a monetary aggregate MZMt , all of which are variables that are commonly
included in monetary VARs. In this paper, yt also contains some additional variables of
interest, namely the real volume of managed liabilities MLt ; the real volume of loans LNSt ;
and the inventories-to-sales ratio Int , such that n = 8 and yt = [Pcomt PIt Yt Int FFt
MZMt LNSt MLt ]′. Let xt = [1 y′t−1 ... y
′
t−p]′ be a vector containing a constant and lagged
observations, where p denotes the number of lags. I use p = 6 in all the estimations.4 A
traditional structural VAR is a system of equations:
Ayt = Bxt +Σεt . (1.13)
4In a previous version of this paper, I used 12 lags which yielded very similar results.
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The structural coefficients are contained in the matrices An×n, Bn×(np+1) and the positive
definite, diagonal matrix Σn×n. The structural shocks εt are i.i.d. ∼ N (0, In). The system
(1.13) can be written in reduced form as
yt = Gxt +ut , (1.14)
where G = A−1B and the relationship between between the fundamental shocks and the
VAR-disturbances is given by Aut = Σεt .
This paper evaluates a non-linear threshold model, as in for instance Balke (2000), as an
alternative to the traditional linear specification in (1.13). Let St be the period t observation
of the spread between the market interest rate and the legal deposit rate ceiling and define
y˜t = [y′t I (St > 0)St ]′ and x˜t = [1 y˜′t−1 ... y˜′t−p]′. I (St > 0) is an indicator variable that
equals one when St > 0 and zero otherwise. Consider the following specification:
Ayt = Bx˜t +CSt +Σεt , if St > 0 ,
Ayt = Bx˜t +Σεt , if St < 0 ,
(1.15)
where the matrices An×n, Bn+1×((n+1)p+1) and Cn×1 contain the structural coefficients. St
is the threshold variable that determines the regime of the dynamic system: When St > 0,
the market rate exceeds the ceiling and the system is in the binding regulation regime;
when St < 0, the system is in the nonbinding regime. The latter includes periods where
the regulation was in place but did not constrain the banks, as well as periods in which the
regulation was no longer active. Specification (1.15) differs from (1.13) by the inclusion
of St in the binding regulation regime. Following Duca (1998), (1.15) also adds lagged
observations of St , truncated at zero, to the dynamic system. The implicit assumption is
therefore that the only source of misspecification in the linear model is the omission of an
important variable: the market rate-ceiling spread St . Positive values of St contain useful
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information about the impact of binding regulation on the economy.5 I posit the following
law of motion for St :
St = Asyt +Bs
[
x′t st
′]′+σsεst , (1.16)
where As1×n, B
s
1×(np+1) are coefficient matrices, st is a row vector containing p lags of St ,
σs > 0 is a scalar, and εst is i.i.d. ∼ N(0,1).
Substituting (1.16) into (1.15) and defining Sˆt = Bsxt +σsεst , the system can be written in
reduced VAR form as
yt = I (St > 0)(A−CAs)−1
[
Bx˜t +CSˆt
]
+ I (St < 0)A−1Bx˜t +ut , (1.17)
or
yt = I (St > 0)G1
[
x˜′t Sˆt
]′+ I (St < 0)G2x˜t +ut . (1.18)
The relationship between the fundamental shocks and the VAR-disturbances is given by
(I (St > 0)(A−CAs)+ I (St < 0)A)ut = Σεt . When C = 0, the threshold model in (1.18)
reduces to the standard linear specification of (1.14).
Data Series. The monthly series included in yt are PCEPI less food and energy for PIt ;
the index of sensitive materials prices for Pcomt ; interpolated real GDP for Yt ; the effective
Federal Funds rate for FFt ; money at zero maturity for MZMt ; the ratio of real inventories
to real sales in trade and manufacturing for Int ; commercial and industrial loans, deflated
by the price index, for LNSt ; and the volume of managed liabilities, deflated by the price
5In principle, it is possible to also allow for regime dependence in the matrices A and B. I abstain from
doing so because observations of St are only available for the subsample in which the regulation was active,
the number of parameters to be estimated per equation is large and the estimation procedure is plagued by
numerical difficulties that are due to local maxima.
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index, for MLt .6 All variables are expressed in natural logs, except for the Federal Funds
rate. The series used for St is the spread between the average of the 3 and 6 month T-bill
rates and the regulatory ceiling on time deposits with maturity between 3 and 6 months.
The choice of variables is motivated by a number of considerations. Pcomt is usually
included in VARs to mitigate the so-called “price puzzle”, the finding that prices rise per-
sistently after a contractionary monetary shock. Real GDP constitutes the broadest measure
of economic activity. I repeated the estimations with the log index of industrial production,
which is available at monthly frequency, but obtained very similar results. Money zero
maturity is the preferred money stock measure because of its stability, because it does not
include any of the components of MLt , and because it is a good data equivalent of Qt/Pt
in the theoretical model.7 I use C&I loans rather than total bank loans, since business
loans are the more appropriate measure in testing for a credit channel affecting production.
Moreover, recent research by Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro (Forthcoming) stresses
the importance of distinguishing between the components of banks’ loan portfolios. Fi-
nally, MLt is a good data equivalent of real deposit holdings (Mt −Qt)/Pt in the theoret-
ical model. An issue in VAR estimation is whether or not to remove time trends. The
inventories-to-sales ratio displays a clear low frequency shift, most likely due to changes
in management techniques during the early 1980s. Also, innovations in financial markets
have caused much higher trend growth in the series for managed liabilities before 1980s
than afterwards. Since these low frequency movements are outside the scope of this paper,
they are removed from the MLt and Int series with the HP filter. The smoothing parameter
is 86,400, as opposed to the conventional choice of 14,400, such as not to remove too much
business cycle variation.
6Detailed descriptions and the sources of all series can be found in the Appendix.
7Money zero maturity (MZM) roughly equals M2 but excludes small time deposits. See Teles and Zhou
(2005) for evidence on the stability of the MZM measure.
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Sample. The monthly data set covers the period 1959:1-2004:4, spanning a period of
about 45 years and containing a total of 544 observations for each series in yt. However,
the estimation of the VAR is conducted using only a subset of the available data points,
including the periods 1959:7-1978:6 and 1983:10 to 2004:4. This means that 63 obser-
vations (1978:7 to 1983:9) are dropped during the estimations in addition to the loss of
observations due to the inclusion of lagged terms. The omission of a range of intermediate
observations is motivated by two considerations. First, the break date of June 1978 marks
the permission of retail money market certificates (MMCs). As explained in the Appendix
describing the history of the regulation, these and other subsequent new instruments offered
market-determined interest rates and greatly facilitated the ability of banks to raise funds
well before the formal removal of regulation Q. The second break date, October 1983,
marks the elimination of the remaining ceilings on small time deposits. The omitted data
points comprise the relevant transition period during which the effects of the regulation
gradually vanished, although the spread variable St takes on very large positive values. A
second reason for the omission is the short-lived experiment of nonborrowed reserve tar-
geting adopted by the Federal Open Market Committee from 1979 to 1982, which resulted
in excessive volatility of the Federal Funds rate during this period. As shown by Bernanke
and Mihov (1998) and Sims and Zha (2006), this period constitutes a significant regime
shift that invalidates the use of a single policy indicator over the entire sample. However,
Bernanke and Mihov (1998) conclude that using the funds rate prior to 1979 and after 1982
produces reasonable results. Finally, note that in the estimation of the St equation in (1.16),
necessarily only the first subsample is used. There are 127 data points for which the spread
is positive, roughly 25% of the entire sample.
Reduced-Form Stability Tests. Before proceeding to the estimation of the structural
model, I perform a number of stability tests based on the reduced-form VAR in (1.14). Ta-
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ble 1.2 reports the bootstrapped p-values of the Wald-statistic testing for the hypothesis of
stable coefficients. Under the null, the VAR-coefficients and the error variance estimated
for the nonbinding periods (St < 0) are equal to those estimated for the binding periods
(St > 0). The rows report the p-values resulting from the application of the test to each
equation in the VAR-system separately. The results indicate that instability across regu-
lation regimes is important: In three of the eight equations (PIt , FFt , MZMt), the null of
stability is rejected at the 5% level. In one other equation (LNSt), the null is rejected at
the 10% level. Therefore, a nonlinear model that takes into account the effect of binding
deposit rate ceilings is more appropriate than the traditional linear specification.
1.4.2 Identification and Estimation Procedure
Identification. Recovering the structural coefficients of the threshold model in (1.17)
is impossible without identification assumptions. In correspondence with a large part of
the literature on monetary VARs, I base the strategy for estimating the effects of a mone-
tary shock on the recursiveness assumption, together with the assumption that the Federal
Funds rate is a good measure of monetary policy. Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) provide arguments why this strategy is reasonable.
Monetary policy is characterized by the rule
FFt = f (Ωt)+ εmt , (1.19)
where f (·) is a linear function and Ωt is the information set of the monetary authority. A
monetary shock, denoted by εmt , is a shock orthogonal to the elements of Ωt . As in the
benchmark model of Christiano et al. (1999), the information set Ωt contains the current
value of Pcomt , Yt , PIt , together with all of the lagged values in x˜t . In this paper, Ωt also
includes the current value of the spread St , as well as the inventories-to-sales ratio Int .
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Given the use of monthly data, this definition of a monetary shock therefore assumes that
the Federal Reserve has within-month data on prices, economic activity, inventories, sales
and market interest rates.
The theoretical model points to a potential caveat in using the Federal Funds rate as
a measure of the monetary stance. A given change in the loan rate reflects a different
monetary intervention depending on the regulation regime, because the liquidity effect is
larger when the ceiling binds. The same could be true for the interest rate in the Federal
Funds market, which implies that, for a given funds rate shock, the actual intervention of the
Fed in the binding regime is smaller than in the nonbinding regime. But with a finding of a
larger effect on output and lending in the binding regime, this objection only corroborates
the evidence for the hypothesis that regulation Q gave the Fed greater leverage over output.
The recursiveness assumption is not sufficient for identification and, following common
practice, I further assume that A is a lower triangular matrix with diagonal elements equal
to one. If C = 0, the structural VAR can be estimated by standard OLS and subsequent
Choleski decomposition of the estimated variance-covariance matrices. If C 6= 0, estimation
of (1.17) requires some more restrictions, since As and Sˆt are unknown. First, I assume that
Yt , PIt , Pcomt and Int are predetermined relative to εst , which implies that the corresponding
elements of C are zero. In other words, a financial market shock to St does not affect output,
prices and inventories and sales within the same month. Second, I assume that there is no
contemporaneous relation between St on the one hand and Yt , PIt , Pcomt and Int on the
other hand, which implies that the corresponding elements of As are zero. Note however
that shocks to Yt , PIt , Pcomt and Int still affect St contemporaneously through their effect
on the other variables.
Estimation Procedure. With the above identification scheme, I estimate (1.17) in the
following two steps:
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1. Obtain estimates of As and Sˆt by instrumental variables estimation of equation (1.16),
using Yt , PIt , Pcomt and Int as instruments;
2. Use these to estimate the coefficients in A, B, C and Σ with conventional maximum
likelihood techniques.
Because relative to the linear structural model, there are only four additional coefficients to
be estimated in the maximum likelihood step, it did not prove to be problematic in practice.
1.4.3 Regime-Dependent Impulse Responses and Counterfactual Ex-
periment
Figure 1.6 plots the estimated regime-dependent impulse response to a one-standard-deviation
(0.25%) shock to the Federal Funds rate in the threshold model (1.17), occurring in period
t = 1. The solid line represents the case where the deposit rate ceiling is nonbinding in
period 1 and all periods following the shock. The dashed line represents the case where
the regulation Q constraint is binding in t = 1 and all subsequent periods. For compari-
son, the dotted line represents the results for the traditional linear specification (1.13). The
grey areas are the (centered) 68% bootstrapped confidence regions for the traditional linear
structural VAR.
According to Figure 1.6, the responses of the main economic aggregates to an unantici-
pated monetary policy tightening are qualitatively in line with the established facts: the rise
in FFt is persistent; there is a sustained drop in Yt and the price level PIt ; the money stock
MZMt goes down. Also, in correspondence with the theoretical model of this paper, the
inventories-to-sales ratio rises after the shock and, as prices adjust, reverts back to trend and
eventually declines in the long run. At the same time, Figure 1.6 reveals some important
differences between the responses with and without a binding regulation Q constraint. A
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first observation is that a binding ceiling exacerbates the output decline from 6 months after
the shock onwards. Moreover, the difference in the output response is quantitatively quite
large and lies outside of the 68% confidence region of the stable VAR impulse response.
The extent to which this finding can be explained by presence of the regulation Q depends
on whether the other variables behave according to the theoretical predictions of the model:
First, an unanticipated funds rate hike of 25 basis points causes the spread between the
market rate and the regulatory ceiling to widen up to 19 basis points in the third month after
the shock. Thus, the pass-through from the funds rate to the spread is considerable.
Second, without constraint, the real volume of managed liabilities MLt expands relative
to trend, peaking 9 months after the shock. With binding deposit rate ceilings, MLt declines
until 6 months after the shock, after which there is a slow reversion back to trend. In the
longer run, the real volume of managed liabilities drops in both cases. The striking differ-
ence during the first 18 months after the shock constitutes evidence that a tighter monetary
stance induces a disintermediation effect and is consistent with the second theoretical pre-
diction. The responses of MLt in both regimes lie well outside of the confidence region of
the stable VAR impulse response.
Third, the negative response of money holdings MZMt is much less pronounced with
binding regulation than without and is outside of the confidence region of the stable VAR.
This result is in line with the conjecture that the binding regulatory ceilings significantly
disrupt the relation between money demand and interest rates. It is therefore consistent with
the third theoretical prediction, that non-interest bearing money holdings respond little to
the interest rate increase if regulation Q binds.
Fourth, although real lending to firms increases immediately after the shock, before
declining in the longer run, the initial increase is much more short-lived with a binding
ceiling. The finding of an increase in business lending is consistent with previous results
in the literature, see for instance Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro (Forthcoming). There
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is a contraction in real lending in the longer run for the regime where the ceiling binds. In
general, it is very hard to draw firm conclusions about the direction of casuality between
lending and economic activity from this type of evidence. Some researchers, such as Romer
and Romer (1990), see the lack of a drop in lending that precedes the decline in output as
evidence against a causal role for bank credit. However, the fact that business lending,
at least initially, expands after a monetary shock can be explained by the desire of firms
to finance an inventory build-up and smooth production. What is more important to the
argument of this paper is the difference between the responses with and without binding
regulation, for which the theory provides a rationale. The evidence is therefore seen as
consistent with the fourth theoretical prediction, that the reduction in firm lending after a
monetary tightening is more severe when the regulatory constraint is binding. Also, the
negative response of firm lending in the binding regime moves outside of the stable VAR
confidence region.
Fifth, the response of the inventories-to-sales ratio in the first few months after the
shock is initially slightly negative with a binding ceiling, remains below the regulation-free
response for the first six months and lies marginally outside of the confidence region for
the stable VAR impulse response. This is in line with the theory, according to which firms
postpone production to a greater extent because larger increases in borrowing cost nega-
tively affect current profit margins. The inventory build-up lasts longer with the regulation
Q constraint, which is more at odds with the theory.8 One possible explanation is that
technological improvements in inventory management since the early 1980s influence the
results for the nonbinding case. A second contributing factor potentially lies in the reaction
of the price level. Without the ceiling, the price level starts to adjust almost immediately
after the shock. In contrast, the drop in the price level occurs much later with the binding
8This is in line with McCarthy and Zakrajsek (2003) who find, using subsample analysis, a smoother and
shorter-lived response of inventories-to-sales ratios after a contractionary monetary shock in recent samples.
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constraint, after about 16 months. To the extent that the price response implies a faster ad-
justment of markups in the nonbinding case, this could be reflected in a swifter adjustment
of inventories.
To gain some further insight in the role of the regulation-induced disintermediation
effect, Figure 1.7 examines the response to an identified one-standard-deviation positive
shock to the interest rate-ceiling spread in equation (1.16). An exogenous increase in St
raises the opportunity cost of holding bank deposits. The figure shows that the rise in the
spread causes an immediate decline in managed liabilities MLt , reflecting substitution out
of time deposits. Interestingly, this decline is associated with a relatively quick drop in real
lending to firms, which constitutes additional evidence that the disintermediation effect
negatively affected the ability of banks to lend during the 1960s and 1970s. The response
of output displays a swift and fairly persistent decline shortly after the shock. There is also
a short-run decrease in the inventories-to-sales ratio. Perhaps more so than for the monetary
shock, the inventories response to a spread shock is in line with the hypothesis that firms
postpone production because increases in borrowing cost negatively affect current profit
margins. This evidence points to effects of a spread shock that are in accordance with
a channel of transmission operating through bank lending. Note how the money stock
increases immediately after the shock. This fact potentially reflects a reaction of the Federal
Reserve to counteract the negative spread shock by a money supply expansion. There is a
slight increase in the price level, and no clear pattern in the response of the Federal Funds
rate, which could be consistent with this conjecture.
Given the evidence of regime dependence in the VAR coefficients, it is informative to
make a comparison with the results from the standard linear specification in (1.13) with sta-
ble coefficients. An interesting question is how the failure to explicitly take into account the
regulation-induced disintermediation effects of the 1960s and 1970s biases the estimated
responses in the standard structural VAR. Perhaps the most obvious observation concerns
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the behavior of monetary aggregates. The linear specification tends to underestimate the
interest elasticity of money demand. The fundamentally different response of MLt also
makes evident why the MZM money definition, which roughly corresponds to M2 exclud-
ing small time deposits, is a more useful measure of the money stock as a macroeconomic
indicator over the sample period. In addition, not taking into account the disintermediation
effect during periods with binding ceilings leads to overestimation of the contractionary
effect on output of a monetary tightening in other periods.
Business Cycle Volatility: A Counterfactual Experiment. This final section addresses
the question to what extent disintermediation effects have contributed to business cycle
volatility during the 1960s and 1970s. The answer involves estimating how the economy
would have evolved, had the regulation Q not been in place. I perform a counterfactual
experiment using the estimated threshold model (1.17). The structural shocks obtained
from the data are fed into the VAR system, but with the indicator variable It equal to zero
in every period. This implies that the spread no longer plays any role for the dynamics of
yt. Figure 1.8 reports the true and simulated HP-filtered paths of real GDP for the 1959:7-
1978:6 sample period.9 The figure shows how all three of the NBER-dated recessions
would have been considerably milder. By and large, most of the differences between the
true and simulated series occur during the 1970s. This is primarily because, in contrast to
the 1960s, the continuous upward revisions of the ceilings were much less sufficient to keep
pace with rising market interest rates in that period. Table 1.3 reports the standard deviation
of HP-filtered real GDP. In accordance with the evidence on the Great Moderation, output
volatility in the data is about twice as large in the 1959:7-1978:6 than in the 1983:10-
2004:4 sample. Removing the effect of the regulation Q ceilings, the output volatility in
the 1959:7-1978:6 sample drops from 1.16% in the data to 0.82% in the counterfactual
9The HP-filter employs a smoothing parameter of 14,400.
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experiment. In other words, the experiment suggests that more than half of the reduction
in output volatility can be explained by removing the effects of deposit rate ceilings in the
data.
1.5 Conclusion
Assessing the role of changes in the monetary transmission mechanism is essential for un-
derstanding the performance of the US economy since the mid 1980s. This paper provides
evidence for a disintermediation phenomenon in the 1960s and 1970s that is linked to the
existence of deposit rate ceilings under regulation Q. In a monetary DSGE model that in-
corporates interest rate ceilings as occasionally binding constraints, I show how binding
ceilings change the behavior of monetary aggregates and their relation with real activity.
In an environment where deposit rate ceilings are binding, the Federal Reserve has greater
leverage over real activity during a monetary tightening. The main predictions of the model
are supported in the data after estimating a threshold VAR aimed at capturing the nonlin-
earities implied by binding regulation.
In the debate on the stability of monetary VARs, my empirical results suggest a signifi-
cant amount of regime dependence in the autoregressive coefficients that is due to changes
in the financial landscape, and to regulation-induced disintermediation effects in particular.
Regarding changes in the volatility of the business cycle, my counterfactual experiment
indicates that output volatility is significantly reduced by removing the effects of deposit
rate ceilings during the 1960s and 1970s. This result suggests that financial markets dereg-
ulation and innovation deserve more attention in future research as an explanation for the
structural changes in the US economy over the last couple of decades.
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Appendix: A Brief History of Regulation Q
Until the second half of the 1950s, regulation Q was of limited significance in US banking,
as the legal ceilings remained well above market rates and the average rates paid on savings
and term deposits. However, the gradual rise of interest rates in the 1950s made the ceilings
bind for the first time since their inception. In order to provide banks with greater flexibility
in competing for funds, in 1957 legislators decided to raise the ceilings for the first time in
over 20 years. Nevertheless, the continuing updrift in market rates throughout the 1960s
and 1970s meant banks were frequently unable to offer competitive yields. The recurrent
problems in the banking sector stirred reactions by both regulators and banks: On the one
hand the maximum rates payable on various types of deposits were frequently revised; on
the other hand, banks actively sought to decrease their reliance on heavily regulated sources
of funds through innovation.
The rising interest rates necessitated frequent adjustments of the ceilings. As an illus-
tration, Figure 1.9 depicts the ceiling on savings deposits at commercial banks, together
with the interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills. The Figure shows how the maximum rate
payable was revised upwards on multiple occasions: To 3.5% in 1962, 4% in 1964, 4.5%
in 1970, 5% in 1973, 5.25% in 1979 and finally to 5.5% in 1984. Similar revisions were
made for the other deposit categories. But despite all these adjustments, market rates re-
peatedly rose above the ceilings. Quarterly surveys conducted by the Federal Home Lone
Bank Board during the 1970s confirm that the vast majority of banks were indeed paying
the maximum rates.10 One major regulatory change occurred during the recession of 1970,
when ceilings on certain types of large time deposits were suspended. The suspension took
place after the volume outstanding of these instruments had shrunk dramatically because
ceilings had hampered banks to compete effectively. Later, in May 1973, all large denomi-
10See Cook (1978) for a discussion of the survey results.
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nation time deposits were freed of interest rate restrictions. Towards the end of the 1970s,
the regulatory attitude started to move more in pace with developments in the financial mar-
kets. Finally, the Monetary Control Act (MCA) of 1980 initiated the phaseout of regulation
Q. In practice, the remaining ceilings on small term deposits were eliminated in October
1983, and those on savings deposits in March 1986.
After the experience of the late 1950s, depository institutions started to reduce their
reliance on heavily regulated sources of funds. The binding ceilings unleashed a cat-and-
mouse game between banks and regulators: Banks would develop a new instrument, after
which the Federal Reserve would declare it a deposit and subject it to regulation Q. Before
1960, almost all deposits at US banks consisted of demand and savings deposits. Figure
1.10, which plots the ratio of managed liabilities to core deposits, shows the shift in deposit
categories throughout the 1960s and 1970s. One of the key innovations in this respect was
the creation in 1961 of large denomination negotiable CDs by a New York bank, together
with the creation of a secondary market. The advantage of the negotiable CD was that
it was a liquid, interest-bearing asset that was marketable when nearing maturity. This
contrasted with standard time deposits which could not bear interest at maturities below
30 days. Within a couple of years, total domestic negotiable CDs outstanding had risen
dramatically. Another innovation were the Eurodollar deposits, which, falling outside of the
jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve, were not subject to regulatory ceilings. After interest
rates had risen well above the maximum rates during the 1973-1975 recession, banks put
strong pressure on legislators for deregulation. In June 1978, the use of retail money market
certificates (MMCs), a new category of 6-month time deposits was permitted. The ceiling
rate on newly issued MMCs was adjusted weekly to the current discount yield on 6-month
T-bills and then remained constant until maturity. Similarly, 1979 saw the introduction of
small saver certificates (SSCs), which had large maturities but also paid market-determined
interest rates. The subsequent growth in the use of MMCs and SSCs, which were effectively
44 Chapter 1: Deposit Rate Ceilings and Monetary Transmission
ridden of interest rate ceilings, greatly improved the ability of banks to compete with money
market instruments from 1978 onwards. In fact, Gilbert et al. (1979) observe how the
authorization of MMCs by Federal regulators arose precisely in an attempt to reduce the
extent of disintermediation.
Theoretical Appendix
Attention is confined to symmetric equilibria in which Pjt = Pt , N jt = Nt , y jt = yt , h jt = ht
and s jt = st for all j ∈ (0,1). In addition, the state space is confined to yield equilibria
where all net nominal interest rates are positive, and it is verified that the inequality in (1.4)
never binds. Although the method used to solve the model allows to take into account the
zero bound on nominal interest rates as well as the inequality in (1.4), both are irrelevant
for the choice of parameters discussed in Section 1.3.2 and are therefore ignored in the
equilibrium definition below.
It is useful to scale the model’s nominal quantities by the beginning-of-period money
stock and define [pt qt wt ]≡ [Pt Qt Wt ]/Mt . In addition, let zt be the inverse markup due to
imperfect competition in the goods markets. An equilibrium is conveniently defined as a
set of sequences of quantities {yt ,ht ,ct ,nt ,qt}∞t=0 and prices {pt ,rt ,Rt ,zt ,wt}∞t=0 such that
in every period t and given the initial conditions p0,n0 − c0 and the period t history of
realizations of χt , the system of equations, given by (B.1)-(B.11) is satisfied.
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The first set of equilibrium conditions summarizes the household’s optimal behavior.
Equation (B.1) determines labor supply by equating the marginal disutility of working to
the real wage, weighted by the marginal utility of consumption 1/ct . The household’s
saving and consumption behavior is governed by the standard Euler condition, given by
equation (B.2). Equation (B.3) specifies the demand for cash. Equation (B.4) stipulates the
regulation Q restriction on the deposit rate and (B.5) specifies monetary policy. Equation
(B.6) specifies the production technology and (B.7) states that the current aggregate stock
of final consumption goods available for sale equals the sum of newly produced goods and
inventories carried over from the previous period. Labor demand is determined by equating
the real wage with the marginal product of labor, as in (B.8). Equation (B.9) determines
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the typical firm’s optimal price-setting behavior, with prices set as markups over expected
discounted future marginal costs. Similar to Jung et al. (2006), the possibility of inventory
investment leads firms to take into account marginal cost two periods ahead rather than one.
Equation (B.10) dictates the firms’ optimal inventory accumulation and is identical to the
first-order condition of inventory investment in the partial equilibrium setting of Bils et al.
(2000). Finally, clearing in the market for loans requires that the nominal wage bill equals
the total volume of loanable funds, as in equation (B.11).
Data Appendix
Data used in Figures 1.1-1.4 and 1.9-1.10
The data on the ceiling rates on the various types of deposits was constructed from the
Annual Statistical Digest published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. The monthly time series are available from the author. Market interest rates are from
Federal Reserve release H.15: Selected Interest Rates. The seasonally adjusted data on de-
posits is from Federal Reserve release H.6: Money Stock Measures. The following series
were used to construct Figures 1.1-1.4.
Figure 1.1: Annualized growth in managed liabilities is the year-on-year growth in the
sum of small and large time deposits, repurchase agreements and eurodollar deposits at
all depository institutions, deflated by the Personal Consumption Expenditures price in-
dex; annualized growth in core deposits is year-on-year growth in savings and checkable
deposits at all depository institutions in the US, deflated by the Personal Consumption Ex-
penditures price index.
Figure 1.2: Spread is the difference between the 3-month Treasury Bill rate and the ceiling
on savings deposits at commercial banks with maturity less than 12 months; annualized
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growth in core deposits is year-on-year growth in savings and checkable deposits at all de-
pository institutions in the US, deflated by the Personal Consumption Expenditures price
index. Core deposits include Money Market Deposit Accounts.
Figure 1.3: Components of managed liabilities are small time deposits, large time deposits,
repurchase agreements and eurodollar deposits at all depository institutions, each divided
by the sum of small and large time deposits, repurchase agreements and eurodollar deposits
at all depository institutions.
Figure 1.4: Annualized growth in small term deposits is year-on-year growth in small term
deposits (STDs) at all depository institutions, deflated by the Personal Consumption Ex-
penditures price index; Spreads are the differences between 1) 3-month T-bill and ceiling
on STDs with maturity from 30 to 89 days, 2) average of 3-month and 6 month T-bill rate
and the ceiling on STDs from 90 to 179 days, 3) average of 6-month T-bill rate and 1 year
T-security rate and the ceiling on STDs from 180 days to 1 year, 4) average of 1-year and
2-year T-security rate and the ceiling on STDs from 1 year to 2 years. Annualized growth
in large term deposits is year-on-year growth in large term deposits (LTDs) at all depository
institutions, deflated by the Personal Consumption Expenditures price index. Spreads are
the differences between 1) 3-month T-bill rate and ceiling on LTDs with maturity from 30
to 59 days, 2) 3-month T-bill rate and the ceiling on LTDs from 60 to 89 days, 3) average of
3-month and 6-month T-bill rate and the ceiling on LTDs from 90 to 179 days, 4) average
of 6-month T-bill rate and 1-year T-security rate and the ceiling on LTDs from 180 days to
1 year.
Figure 1.9: Ceiling on savings deposits at commercial banks with maturity less than 12
months; 3-Month Treasury Bill rate (secondary market).
Figure 1.10: The ratio of managed liabilities is the sum of small and large time deposits,
repurchase agreements and eurodollar deposits at all depository institutions divided by the
sum of savings and checkable deposits at all depository institutions.
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Additional Data used in VARs
Price Index: Personal Consumption Expenditures Chain-Type Price Index Less Food and
Energy, Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis, http://research.stlouisfed.org/
Commodity Price Index: Index of Sensitive Materials Prices, Business Cycle Indicators,
The Conference Board Series, http://www.conference-board.org
Real GDP: Real Gross Domestic Product, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis (NIPA), http://www.bea.gov/
Inventories-to-Sales Ratio: Ratio of Manufacturing and Trade Inventories (Chained 2000
$) to Manufacturing and Trade Sales (Chained 2000 $), Business Cycle Indicators, The
Conference Board Series, (mnemonics A0M070 and A0M057) http://www.conference-
board.org
Federal Funds Rate: Effective Federal Funds Rate, The Federal Reserve System’s H.15
release, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15.
Commercial and Industrial Loans: Commercial and Industrial Loans at All Commercial
Banks, H.8 Statistical Release of the Federal Reserve System,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8.
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Figure 1.1: Annualized Real Growth in Core Deposits and Managed Liabilities.
Monthly data (Jan 1960-Dec 2005). Grey areas indicate NBER-dated recessions (peak-to-
through). Data Sources: See Appendix.
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Figure 1.2: Annualized Real Growth in Core Deposits and 3-Month Treasury Bill - Ceiling
Spread.
Monthly data (Jan 1960- Mar 1986). Grey areas indicate NBER-dated recessions (peak-to-
through). Data Sources: See Appendix.
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Figure 1.3: Components of Managed Liabilities.
Monthly data (Jan 1960-Dec 2005). Grey areas indicate NBER-dated recessions (peak-to-
through). Data Sources: See Appendix.
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Table 1.1: Parameter Values of the Theoretical Model
Household Preferences
β 1.03−0.25 Household discount factor
Ψ 0.64 Time allocation parameter
Ω 4.38e−5 Utility weight of real cash balances
φ 0.24 Interest rate elasticity of money demand
ε 5.79 Price elasticity of demand for goods
ξ 0.08 Sales stock elasticity of demand for goods
Technology
α 0.64 Labor input elasticity of production
θ 0.18 Fixed cost of production
Monetary Policy
µ 1.012 Average money growth rate
ρ 0.3 Persistence of the shock
σ 0.012 Standard deviation of the shock
Table 1.2: Reduced-Form Stability Tests
Equation: PCOMt PIt Yt Int FFt MZMt LNSt MLt
p-value 0.105 0.001 0.4628 0.1478 0.041 0.002 0.063 0.237
The numbers are p-values for the Wald statistic testing for the null hypothesis that the reduced-
form coefficients in the nonbinding regulation Q periods (St < 0) equal those of the binding periods
(St > 0). The test is applied jointly to the autoregressive coefficients and the error variance. The
p-values are based on 5000 bootstrap simulations.
Table 1.3: Standard Deviation of HP-filtered Real GDP
Series Sample St.Dev.
Data 1960:1-1978:6 1.16%
Experiment no Reg Q 1960:1-1978:6 0.82%
Data 1983:10-2004:4 0.58%
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Figure 1.5: Theoretical Response to a One-St.-Dev. Negative Money Growth Shock.
The shock occurs in period 1. The solid line depicts the response without regulation Q and the
dashed line depicts the response with binding regulation Q.
Chapter 1: Deposit Rate Ceilings and Monetary Transmission 55
1 12 24 36 48
−0.5
0
0.5
Federal Funds Rate FF
t
months
 
 
1 12 24 36 48
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Price Index PI
t
months
 
 
1 12 24 36 48
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
Real GDP Y
t
months
 
 
1 12 24 36 48
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Inventories/Sales In
t
months
1 12 24 36 48
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Spread S
t
months
1 12 24 36 48
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Money Stock MZM
t
months
1 12 24 36 48
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Loans LNS
t
months
1 12 24 36 48
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Managed Liab. ML
t
months
Non−Binding Regime Binding Regime Stable VAR
Figure 1.6: Response to a One-St.-Dev. Positive Funds Rate Shock in period 1.
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Figure 1.7: Response to a One-St.-Dev. Positive Spread Shock in period 1.
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Figure 1.8: Real GDP Counterfactual Experiment.
Grey areas indicate NBER-dated recessions (peak-to-through). The solid line depicts the
true data and the dashed line depicts the simulated path of real GDP for the experiment
without regulation Q.
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Figure 1.9: 3-Month T-Bill Rate and Ceiling on Savings Deposits at Commercial Banks.
Monthly data (Nov 1933-Dec 1989). Data Sources: See Appendix.
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Figure 1.10: Ratio of Managed Liabilities to Core Deposits.
Monthly data (Jan 1960-Dec 2005). Grey areas indicate NBER-dated recessions (peak-to-
through). Data Sources: See Appendix.
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2.1 Introduction
In October 1997, Standard & Poor’s downgraded South Korea’s sovereign risk status. Dur-
ing the first quarter of 1998, Korea’s net exports-to-GDP ratio rose by more than 18%,
GDP contracted by 8.7%, consumption by 13%, and investment by 30%. One year later,
GDP, consumption and investment were growing at 10% or more. What causes these abrupt
declines in capital inflows, known as “Sudden Stops” (Calvo, 1998), and why are they ac-
companied by depression-sized, but short-lived, contractions in economic activity?
This paper argues that a shift in expectations about future productivity growth can trig-
ger a Sudden Stop such as the one experienced by South Korea. I propose a small open
economy model that suffers from a “peso problem”: There is a non-zero probability that
productivity growth switches to a bad regime. In response to news signals about future
productivity growth, agents revise the probability of the bad regime occurring. The model
displays equilibrium paths which, after agents receive bad news, are characterized by an
increase in net exports, and a decrease in aggregate output, employment, investment and
consumption. Agents are fully rational and during the Sudden Stop, there is never any
actual change in productivity growth. When the news signal turns out to be false, the econ-
omy quickly reverts to its previous growth path, which requires a period of above-trend
growth. To quantitatively account for the Korean experience without unrealistic adjust-
ments in expectations, the model relies on a number of amplification mechanisms, such
as variable capacity utilization, predetermined labor, a working capital constraint and an
expectation-elastic country risk premium. Because Sudden Stops are phenomena that lead
the economy far away from steady states and given the focus on expectations, I solve the
model using a nonlinear global approximation method.
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The idea that shifts in expectations can drive macroeconomic fluctuations goes back as
far as Pigou (1927), but has received renewed attention in the context of modern business
cycle models.1 This is also not the first paper to explore the role of adverse expectations in
emerging markets crises. They are an inherent feature of all models in which crises are self-
fulfilling events, such as for instance Obstfelt (1986) or Chang and Velasco (2001). How-
ever, the model in this paper does not display equilibrium indeterminacy. With Corsetti,
Pesenti and Roubini (1999) and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001), it shares the
emphasis that future, rather than current, events cause crises.2 But the model in this paper
is not one of perfect foresight, such that the occurrence of a crisis does not hinge on the
future event materializing. The implication is that it is not only difficult to predict crises,
they may also be hard to rationalize ex post.
In the literature, there are several approaches to modeling Sudden Stops in a Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework. In a sense, the most closely related is
by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). They show in a standard small open economy model that a
large and persistent decrease in productivity growth generates a Sudden Stop, together with
contractions in GDP, consumption and investment. With a persistent shock, agents also re-
vise expectations about future productivity growth. The persistence is crucial for obtaining
responses that are typical of Sudden Stops. In contrast with Aguiar and Gopinath (2007),
in this paper a Sudden Stop occurs without any change in productivity growth. Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007) base their evidence for a negative TFP growth shock on the estimation
of Solow residuals. However, as the authors themselves point out, the large decreases in
measured TFP are to a large extent only indicative of endogenous links between measured
1Examples include Danthine, Donaldson and Johnsen (1999), Beaudry and Portier (2004), Jaimovich and
Rebelo (2006), Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2007) and Prades (2007).
2In the case of Corsetti et al. (1999) and Burnside et al. (2001), it are the large prospective fiscal deficits
associated with implicit bailout guarantees to failing banks that trigger currency crises.
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TFP and Sudden Stops. I allow for variable capacity utilization such that a Sudden Stop is
accompanied by a change in the measured Solow residual.
Many models in the literature focus on the role of credit frictions. One common approach
is to model a Sudden Stop as an exogenous tightening of a collateral constraint. Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) show that this type of shock tends to stimulate output unless
further frictions are included. Christiano, Gust and Roldos (2004) impose advance payment
constraints on intermediate inputs to produce output drops. Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci
(2003) model the Korean crisis as caused by an exogenous increase in the country risk
premium and rely on a financial accelerator framework to explain the depth of the crisis. I
also incorporate a financial propagation mechanism in the form of a working capital con-
straint and an expectation-elastic risk premium. The approach in this paper is different,
however, as both the Sudden Stop and the associated recession arise endogenously after an
adjustment in expectations. The financial friction is not necessary to qualitatively match
the Korean crisis experience, but is nevertheless important to obtain fluctuations that are
quantitatively similar.
In the business cycle models of Mendoza (2006) and Mendoza and Smith (2006), Sud-
den Stops are also endogenous. In their setup, when the economy moves towards a high
debt state, shocks of standard magnitudes can force a collateral constraint to bind, trigger-
ing highly nonlinear dynamics that resemble Sudden Stops. Their model does not hinge
on large unexpected shocks; it captures precautionary motives; and Sudden Stops are rare
events nested within regular business cycle movements. The model in this paper can also
explain Sudden Stops without large exogenous shocks to TFP, interest rates or the terms of
trade. However, to trigger a Sudden Stop, a fairly large (but not unrealistic) shock to expec-
tations is necessary. As in Mendoza (2006), agents engage in precautionary behavior, and
since I model shocks to expectations necessary to generate a Sudden Stop as rare events,
they arise infrequently within regular business cycles. In contrast with Mendoza (2006),
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the economy does not need to be in a high debt state to experience a crisis. Indeed, this
property is important for the Korean case, as its foreign debt-to-GDP ratio was far lower at
the onset of the crisis than for instance in the 1980s.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the theoretical
model; Section 2.3 discusses the calibration to South Korean data and the numerical solu-
tion technique; Section 2.4 presents the model response to a news shock, compares it with
the Korean experience and performs a sensitivity analysis of the key parameters; Section
2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
The model is that of a single good neoclassical small open economy that faces stochastic
shocks to the growth rate of productivity. Agents receive stochastic news about future pro-
ductivity growth and are fully rational in judging the reliability of the news. Both house-
holds and domestic firms trade a non-contingent real bond. As in Neumeyer and Perri
(2005), Mendoza (2006) and Uribe and Yue (2006), the latter trade in the asset because of
the presence of a working capital constraint that requires firms to advance the wage bill be-
fore final output is available. Following Neumeyer and Perri (2005), the model also allows
for a country risk premium that is decreasing in expected future productivity. Together,
these two features amplify news shocks through changes in interest rates. Two other model
ingredients are variable capacity utilization and the requirement that firms choose labor in-
put before the realization of present period uncertainty. Variation in the utilization rate of
the capital stock leads to propagation mainly through the effect on the marginal product of
labor. Predetermined labor input means that firms hire workers based on expected rather
than actual productivity levels. The rest of the model closely resembles the canonical small
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open economy real business cycle models in for instance Mendoza (1991), Correia, Neves
and Rebelo (1995) or Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003).
Time is discrete and in each period t, there are two subperiods: t− in the beginning of t and
t+ at the end of t. Time t+ and (t +1)− are arbitrarily close. All uncertainty is revealed to
the agents in period t−. Table 2.1 summarizes the timing of events.
Firms and Technology. At time t− a representative firm rents capital services kst and, in
combination with labor input ht , produces yt of an international tradable good, which be-
comes available in t+. The firm’s labor input decision must be made in (t−1)+, i.e. before
the realization of period t uncertainty. The firm is entirely owned by domestic households.
Factor markets are perfectly competitive, and production occurs through the constant re-
turns to scale technology
yt = (kst )
α (Γtht)1−α , 0 < α < 1 , (2.1)
Γt = gtΓt−1 .
Γt measures the level of labor-augmenting technology, which grows at a stochastic rate
ln(gt). The firm needs to borrow working capital in advance: In order to transfer wtht to
workers in t+, where wt is the real wage, the firm needs to issue bonds worth wtht in t−
at a rate Rt−1. Given prices, the firm chooses ks to maximize time t+ profits yt − rtkst −
Rt−1wtht , subject to the technological constraint in (2.1). The firm chooses ht to maximize
the appropriately weighted expectation of time t+ profits, given by
Et−1 [λt (yt − rtkst −Rt−1wtht)] . (2.2)
The firm takes λt , the marginal utility of consumption of its owner, as exogenous.
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Households and Preferences. The economy is populated by identical, infinitely-lived
households with preferences described by
E0
∞
∑
t=0
exp
(
−
t−1
∑
τ=0
β(cτ, lτ)
)
(
ct −Γt−1ζ l
1+ψ
t
1+ψ
)1−γ
Γγt−1
1− γ
 , (2.3)
β(cτ, lτ) = ξ ln
(
1+Γ−1τ−1cτ−ζ
l1+ψτ
1+ψ
)
,
ψ > 0 , γ > 1 , 0 < ξ≤ γ , ζ > 0 ,
where ct denotes consumption and lt is time spent in the workplace. As in Mendoza (1991),
these preferences feature an endogenous rate of time preference that increases with the past
level of consumption. The inclusion of an endogenous discount factor is one way to avoid
a unit root in bond holdings and otherwise has little implications for the model dynamics
(Schmitt-Grohe´ et al., 2003). The momentary utility function is of the form proposed
by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988). With this specification, optimal labor
effort depends only on the contemporaneous real wage. These preferences are popular in
small open economy models because they generate more realistic business cycles moments
(Correia et al., 1995). They also facilitate the numerical solution procedure by eliminating a
root-finding operation. The term Γt−1 enters the utility function to ensure the existence of a
balanced growth equilibrium. Given these preferences, the marginal utility of consumption
λt is given by
λt =
(
ct −Γt−1ζ l
1+ψ
t
1+ψ
)−γ
Γγt−1−ξ
(
1+Γ−1t−1ct −ζ
l1+ψt
1+ψ
)−1
e−β(ct ,lt)
Vt
Γt−1
,(2.4)
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where
Vt = Et

(
ct+1−Γtζ l
1+ψ
t+1
1+ψ
)1−γ
1− γ Γ
γ
t + e
−β(ct+1,lt+1)Vt+1
 .
At time t−, households supply labor and capital services. At time t+ they receive factor
payments and make consumption and investment decisions. Households own a stock of
capital kt , and capital services kst are equal to the product of the capital stock and the rate
of capacity utilization ut . The households’ budget constraint in period t is
ct + xt +Rt−1dt ≤ dt+1+wt lt + rtutkt , (2.5)
where xt are resources for investment and dt+1 is the households’ foreign debt position.
Long-run solvency is enforced by imposing an upper bound on foreign debt, dt+1 < Γt d¯.
This condition precludes households from running Ponzi-type schemes.3
The law of motion for capital is
kt+1 = xt +
(
1−δ−η u
1+ω
t
1+ω
)
kt − φ2
(
kt+1
kt
−µ
)2
kt , (2.6)
φ > 0 , µ > 1 , η > 0 , ω > 0 .
As in Baxter and Farr (2001), the rate of capital depreciation depends positively on capital
utilization. There is a quadratic capital adjustment cost, and µ is the economy’s average
productivity growth factor.
The households’ problem is to choose state-contingent sequences of ct , lt , xt , ut , kt+1 and
dt+1 to maximize expected utility (2.3), subject to the budget constraints (2.5), the borrow-
3Choosing a large value for d¯, the probability of reaching the debt limit in the stochastic steady state can
be made arbitrarily small.
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ing constraints and the law of motion for capital (2.6), for given prices wt , rt and Rt and
initial values k0 and d0.
The Interest Rate. A large mass of international investors is willing to purchase the
economy’s bonds at a rate Rt . The bonds are risky assets because default on payments to
foreigners is possible. The interest rate faced by the small open economy is given by
Rt = ρDt , (2.7)
where ρ is the international rate for riskless assets and Dt is the country risk premium. As
in Neumeyer and Perri (2005), private domestic lenders always receive the full loan plus
interest, but there is a probability that the local government will confiscate all interest pay-
ments to foreign lenders. Foreign bond holders determine the interest rate and, given the
small open economy assumption, domestic agents take Rt as given. To be consistent with
this interpretation, I verify that in the numerical analysis foreign lenders always lend posi-
tive amounts in equilibrium. Default decisions are not modelled explicitly. As in Neumeyer
and Perri (2005), the risk premium depends negatively on expected future productivity. For
practical purposes, the dependence on expected productivity is captured by the following
functional form:
Dt = χ1 (1+Et [gt+1]−µ)−χ2 , χ1 > 1 , χ2 ≥ 0 . (2.8)
Arrelano (2006) provides a model in which a negative relation between default incentives
and expected productivity arises endogenously.
News and States of Technology. I discipline the modelling of the news and technology
processes by maintaining the assumption of rational expectations and by pursuing extreme
Chapter 2: The Role of Expectations in Sudden Stops 69
parsimony in the number of parameters. This is to counter any suggestion that a purely
arbitrary formation of expectations explains the fit of the model.
Productivity growth gt is a discrete Markov chain with support µ = {µB,µG}, i.e. there is a
“bad” state and a “good” state. The transition matrix is
P =
 pBB 1− pGG
1− pBB pGG
 , (2.9)
where the i j-th entry is Pr(gt+1 = µi|gt = µ j). Agents receive news nt about the growth rate
two periods in advance. A two period lead is the minimum to ensure that firms alter labor
input in response to news, while larger leads come at significant computational cost. The
agents’ perception of the news accuracy is captured by a matrix Q, given by
Q =
 q 1−q
1−q q
 , (2.10)
where the i j-th element is Pr(nt = µi|gt+2 = µ j). The parameter 0.5≤ q≤ 1 is a measure for
the news precision. To avoid over-parametrization, the news signal contains no information
about uncertainty in t+1 and its accuracy is independent of the history of shocks up to time
t. Suppose in period t the economy is in the good state µG and news arrives of a switch to
the bad state in t +2. When q = 0.5 the news signal does not contain any information and
the time t expectation of productivity growth in t+2 equals the unconditional expectation.
When q = 1, the signal is perfect and expected productivity in t + 2 equals µB. When
0.5 < q < 1, agents expect productivity growth to be in between these two values.
Given the rationality assumption, the agents’ subjective assessment of the news accuracy
corresponds to the objective accuracy. Let n−t denote the previous period value of nt and let
xit be shorthand notation for xt = µi. Then all the above assumptions imply the following
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transition probabilities for the technology/news processes:
Pr(git+1,n
n
t+1,n
−v
t+1 | g jt ,nlt ,n−st ) = dvl Pr(nnt+1 | git+1,g jt ,nlt ,n−st )Pr(git+1 | g jt ,nlt ,n−st ) . (2.11)
The first term in (2.11), dvl , equals 1 if v = l and zero otherwise. The second term is
Pr(nnt+1 | git+1,g jt ,nlt ,n−st ) =∑
k
Pr(nnt+1 | gkt+2,git+1,g jt ,nlt ,n−st )Pr(gkt+2 | git+1,g jt ,nlt ,n−st ) , (2.12)
where Pr(nnt+1 | gkt+2,git+1,g jt ,nlt ,n−st )=∑w QnwPwk and Pr(gkt+2 | git+1,g jt ,nlt ,n−st ) =QlkPki/∑k QlkPki.
Finally, the third term is
Pr(git+1 | g jt ,nlt ,n−st ) =
Pr(nlt | git+1,g jt ,n−st )Pr(git+1 | g jt ,n−st )
∑i Pr(nlt | git+1,g jt ,n−st )Pr(git+1 | g jt ,n−st )
, (2.13)
where Pr(git+1 | g jt ,n−st ) = QsiPi j/∑i QsiPi j and Pr(nlt | git+1,g jt ,n−st ) = ∑k QlkPki. The state tran-
sition matrix is fully determined by only three parameters: The productivity transition
probabilities pGG and pBB and the news accuracy parameter q.
Equilibrium and Balanced Growth. Given initial conditions k0 and d0 and a sequence
for productivity growth gt and news nt , an equilibrium is a sequence of allocations {kt+1, ht ,
lt , dt+1, ct , xt , ut}∞t=0 and prices {wt , rt , Rt}∞t=0 such that the allocations solve the firms’ and
households’ problems at the equilibrium prices and all markets clear. A balanced growth
equilibrium is an equilibrium where [kt , dt+1, ct , xt ]/Γt−1 are stationary variables. The
balanced growth equilibrium is summarized by a system of Euler equations, which is given
in the Appendix.
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2.3 Calibration and Solution Methodology
The time period in the model corresponds to six months. This choice follows from a trade-
off between the computational burden of a larger number of news leads and the ability to
match the Korean Crisis data.
News and States of Technology. The parametrization of the state space and transitions
probabilities requires numerical values for five parameters: µB, µG, pGG, pBB and q. All of
these determine the size of the change in expectations following a news shock. If a news
shock is to explain the large macroeconomic volatility during Sudden Stop episodes, the
shock can be thought to be fairly large. At the same time, large news shocks should be
restricted to occur infrequently, as Sudden Stops within the same country are rare. There-
fore, a natural approach for setting the parameter values is to construct a “peso problem”,
as in for instance Danthine and Donaldson (1999). I think of µB as a depression state with
a very low probability of occurring and of µG as the actual productivity growth rate in the
sample of observations. In practice, the probability that the economy moves from the good
to the bad state µB is 1%, i.e. pGG = 0.99, and µG = µ = 1.019 equals the value calibrated
below for 1980-2002 Korean data. Since one period in the model corresponds to 6 months,
the expected duration of the high growth regime is 50 years, the same as in Danthine and
Donaldson (1999).
It is possible to compute Et [gt+2 | gt = µG,nt = µB], the expected productivity growth in
t + 2 conditional on being in the good state in period t with a bad signal. Figure 2.1 plots
this expectation for various values of µB and q. Evidently, it is non-increasing in productiv-
ity growth in the bad state µB, and decreasing in news precision q. When q = 0.5, the news
signal does not contain any information and the time t expectation of productivity in t +2
equals the unconditional expectation, which is very close to µG. When q = 1, the signal
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is perfect and expected productivity growth in t + 2 is µB. When 0.5 < q < 1, the expec-
tation lies in between µG and µB. Figure 2.1 makes clear that generating sizeable changes
in expectations requires high values for q. The benchmark calibration will therefore have
q = 0.99. I choose the value of µB such that Et [gt+2 | gt = µG,nt = µB] = 1. Hence, when
bad news arrives in period t, agents revise their forecast for semiannual productivity growth
in t+2 downwards from 1.9% to 0%. This choice strikes a balance between having an ad-
justment that is sufficiently large and infrequent, and one that reasonably lies within the
agents’ belief set. In practice, µB = 0.985 and the conditional probability that the bad state
realizes given bad news is about 0.55. Given the choice for pGG, the probability pBB that
the bad state persists the next period has only a small effect on Et [gt+2 | gt = µG,nt = µB].
Nevertheless, pBB is an important parameter as the expected duration of the bad state has
consequences for the agents’ savings decision. In the benchmark calibration, I set pBB to
0.25.4
Given the peso problem setup, three key parameters thus determine the dynamics of
expectations following bad news: The bad state value µB, the news accuracy q, and the
expected duration of the bad state, captured by pBB. In the robustness section, I explore
alternative values for these parameters, and therefore smaller and larger shocks to expecta-
tions. Although a switch to the bad technology state is extremely rare, a bad news shock is
more frequent. Under the benchmark calibration, bad news arrives in the good state once
every 23 years. Hence, roughly one out of two occurrences of the bad news shock will not
be followed by an actual change in productivity growth. This property is consistent with
the presumption that in the sample of observations for Korea the depression state has not
occurred, whereas a Sudden Stop has.
4For comparison, Danthine and Donaldson (1999) set the persistence of their depression state to 0.20.
Chapter 2: The Role of Expectations in Sudden Stops 73
Model Parameters. I set the gross annual interest rate to 1.05, the average 3 month T-bill
rate that prevailed in the years surrounding the crisis. The country risk premium in tranquil
times is one percent, the approximate average value of the EMBI global spread for Korea
in non-crisis years, and also the value at the onset of the crisis. Together, this choice yields
an annual interest rate of 6%.
The labor elasticity of output α takes on the conventional value of 0.36, which implies
a labor share in total factor earnings for Korea that is in between the value of 0.5 used by
Gertler et al. (2003) and the value 0.7 calculated by Young (1995). The average productiv-
ity growth factor is µ= 1.019 in order to match the average gross capital formation-to-GDP
ratio of approximately 0.31 in 1980-2002 in a non-stochastic version of the model which
excludes the bad state. The annual productivity growth rate is therefore 3.8%. The pa-
rameters δ and η normalize the rate of capacity utilization to one and generate an annual
depreciation rate of 0.1 in the non-stochastic model. A difficult parameter to calibrate is ω,
the elasticity of marginal depreciation with respect to capital utilization. Basu and Kimball
(1997) obtain a point estimate for the US of unity, but their 95% confidence bounds are
wide: [−0.2,2]. Baxter et al. (2001) find in the context of an international two-country
RBC model that lower values, ω = 0.05 or 0.10, fit the data well. The benchmark calibra-
tion in this paper will take a value of 0.05, but the numerical analysis also considers higher
values.
The value for ζ normalizes hours worked to one in the non-stochastic model. The wage
elasticity of labor supply is 2.2 (or ψ = 0.45), as in Mendoza (1991). The elasticity of the
discount factor ξ = 0.061 matches the average net foreign debt position-to-GDP ratio of
0.21 in Korea, which I obtain by averaging annual data from of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2006) for the period 1980 to 1997. The implied consumption-to-GDP ratio is 0.68, which
is roughly in line with the value of 0.71 in the data. The parameters γ and φ are 2 and 2.5
respectively, well within the range of conventional values. Finally, I choose χ2 = 0.76 to
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match the 5% increase in the risk premium during the Korean Crisis episode. Table 2.2
summarizes all the values used for generating the results under the benchmark calibration.
Numerical Solution Technique. I obtain the approximate model solution to the system
of Euler equations describing the equilibrium behavior of the various macroeconomic vari-
ables, given in the Appendix. The numerical method used is time iteration, as described
by Coleman (1990). Time iteration is generally slow and therefore the iterative scheme is
augmented by the application of the method of endogenous gridpoints, developed by Car-
rol (2006). This method reduces the number of nonlinear equations that need to be solved
numerically in every iteration.
The model features two endogenous state variables, kt and dt (detrended), and five exoge-
nous state variables: The current and previous period value of gt , the news shock nt and
the two lags nt−1,nt−2. The additional lags of nt and gt are necessary to evaluate lagged
expectations. All functions are approximated by a linear interpolation scheme based on a
(11×11) grid of the (kt ,dt) space, which means their continuous nature is preserved. As a
result, each function is approximated over a total number of 3872 nodes. Further increasing
the number of nodes does not lead to any noticeable changes in the results.
2.4 Quantitative Properties of the Model
2.4.1 Matching the Korean Crisis Episode
Figure 2.2 plots equilibrium paths of the key macroeconomic variables, together with their
data equivalents for the years surrounding the Korean Crisis. The first row depicts the
annualized growth rate of real GDP, consumption and investment. The second row plots
hours worked (in percentage deviation from the 1996 value), the country risk premium
and the net exports-to-GDP ratio. The equilibrium paths are for the following sequence of
Chapter 2: The Role of Expectations in Sudden Stops 75
shocks: Prior to the second half of 1997 (1997:2), the model economy has been in high
growth state µG for an arbitrarily long period with the news signal correctly predicting
future states. In 1997:2, bad news arrives about productivity growth in 1998:2. The bad
news persists in 1998:1 and when 1998:2 arrives, the signal returns to predicting µG. During
the whole experiment, there is never any change in productivity growth. The transition
probabilities in (2.11), which imply that the news shock displays persistence of 0.14, lead
to the following expectation dynamics: In 1997:2, bad news shifts expectations, which are
rationally adjusted downwards from 1.9% to 0% productivity growth for 1998:2. When
1998:1 brings bad news about 1999:1, agents incorporate this additional information into
their forecasts and expected productivity growth in 1998:2 drops further to −1.3%. In
1998:2, the information that the initial news signal was false and the good news signal
about 1999:2 both lead to an upward revision to 0.4% of the forecast for 1999:1. In 1999:1,
agents return to anticipating 1.9% growth for the subsequent periods. The first column
in Table 2.3 summarizes the dynamics of expected productivity growth in response to the
news sequence.5
The model succeeds in capturing the key aspects of the Korean crisis experience. Con-
sistent with the data, the news shock causes a rise in net exports and contractions in GDP,
consumption, investment and hours. Quantitatively, the responses are of magnitudes asso-
ciated with Sudden Stop episodes: Annual GDP growth plummets from 3.8% to −7.7%;
hours worked decline by 12%; consumption falls by 6.2% and investment contracts with
31% on an annual basis. The net exports-to-GDP ratio shoots up from 0.3% to 11%. The
model also closely matches the subsequent swift recovery after the crisis. As in the data,
GDP, consumption and investment grow above trend in the year following the crisis.
In some respects, the model performs less well. Consumption falls more than GDP dur-
5An alternative experiment has the news signal switch back to µG in 1998:1. The results are qualitatively
very similar to the experiment in which the bad news persists. Without persistent news, the recession is
quantitatively smaller and lasts for one period only. The results are available on request.
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ing the crisis, whereas the model yields the reverse. Because the model underpredicts the
consumption drop, the increase in net exports is smaller than in the data. Also, the net
exports-to-GDP ratio remains high after the crisis, but reverts in the model. Another issue
is timing. According to the theory, investment leads GDP and consumption. In reality, the
contraction and recovery of these variables is more simultaneous. Nevertheless, the exper-
iment shows that the shock to expectations goes a long way in explaining the Sudden Stop,
the associated economic crisis and the quick recovery experienced by South-Korea.
To understand the mechanics of the response to a news shock in period t = 1997:2, it
is useful to see what drives the eventual reduction in real activity in t + 2 = 1998:1. The
output drop is primarily caused by a decrease in hours worked. The equilibrium in the labor
market can be loosely summarized by the following equations:
0 =Et+1
[
λt+2
(
Rt+1wt+2− (1−α)Γ1−αt+2
(
ut+2kt+2
ht+2
)α)]
, (Labor Demand)
wt+2 =ζl
ψ
t+2Γt+1 , (Labor Supply)
lt+2 =ht+2 . (Labor Market Clearing)
The labor demand and supply equations follow from the firm’s and households’ optimality
conditions. Three ingredients of the model are key for inducing a large decline in hours:
Predetermined labor, the working capital constraint and the expectation-elastic country risk
premium. Firms choose labor input for t + 2 production before the realization of time
t+2 uncertainty, and lower expected labor productivity induces them to demand less labor.
Since the country’s risk premium in t + 1 increases with lower expected productivity, the
interest rate Rt+1 rises. Because firms need to finance the wage bill in advance by issuing
bonds, the rise in Rt+1 increases the cost of hiring labor in t + 2, causing a further reduc-
tion in labor demand. In general equilibrium, both these effects dominate and hours drop
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through a decrease in the real wage. Because expectations for t+3 productivity growth are
still relatively low in t +2, the cut in hours persists in t +3.
To assess the relative importance of predetermined labor and the financial propagation
mechanism, Figure 2.3 plots the equilibrium paths for the same shock sequences in three
models: The benchmark model, a version in which labor responds contemporaneously to
productivity shocks (“Variable Labor”), and a version without financial propagation mech-
anism in which the elasticity of the risk premium χ2 is zero (“R Fixed”). In the benchmark
model, hours worked decline by 12%. Without financial propagation mechanism, hours fall
by 6.4%, and with variable labor by 5.3%. Hence, both predetermined labor and the finan-
cial propagation stemming from the working capital constraint and the expectation-elastic
risk premium are important for generating a large response of hours worked.
The decline in economic activity after the news shock is also due to reductions in the
capital stock and in the rate of capacity utilization. In order to obtain a drop in investment
that is comparable to the data, the expectation-elastic risk premium is the key model ingre-
dient, at least under the benchmark calibration. Figure 2.3 shows how investment falls in
all variants of the model, but only when the risk premium increases is the reaction similar
in size to the data. To see why, note that the households’ asset choice is determined by an
arbitrage condition stating that the expected return in utils of buying one additional bond
or investing one more unit should be equal,
Et [λt+2]Rt+1 =Et
[
λt+2(1+ rkt+2)
]
, (Arbitrage)
where the return on capital investment rkt+2 is given by
rkt+2 =
rt+2+1−δ−ηu
1+ω
t+2
1+ω +Φ
(
kt+3
kt+2
)
1+φ
(
kt+2
kt+1
−µ
) −1 , (Return to Capital)
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where Φ
(
kt+3
kt+2
)
= φ
(
kt+3
kt+2
−µ
)
kt+3
kt+2
− φ2
(
kt+3
kt+2
−µ
)2
. In equilibrium, the rental rate of capital
equals the marginal product of capital services,
rt+2 =αut+2
(
ut+2kt+2
Γt+2ht+2
)α−1
. (Rental Rate of Capital)
The households’ optimality condition for capacity utilization is
ηuωt+2 =α
(
ut+2kt+2
Γt+2ht+2
)α−1
, (Capacity Utilization)
which states that the marginal benefit of higher utilization equals the marginal cost in terms
of higher capital depreciation. Households expect the marginal product of capital to be
lower in t + 2 because of the decline in hours and because of lower expected productivity
in period t + 2. The decline in hours also causes a fall in capacity utilization in t + 2,
which has an additional negative effect on the marginal product of capital. On the other
hand, lower utilization reduces capital depreciation, which raises the t+2 return to capital.
Overall, the equalization of capital and bond returns requires a contraction of period t +1
investment. Evidently, if the bond rate rises after the shock to expectations, the required
drop in investment is much larger. Because adjusting the capital is stock is costly, the
households, who anticipate the course of events, start cutting investment in period t. Since
hours do not react significantly until t +2, the resulting lower capital stock in t +1 yields
a slight increase in capacity utilization before a significant decrease in t + 2. In t + 2,
investment growth remains negative because of lower expectations for productivity growth
in t + 3. From t + 3 onwards, investment growth picks up in order to catch up with the
trend. Because of adjustment costs, the capital stock remains below trend for a longer
period, resulting in high levels of capacity utilization during the recovery.
To understand the response of consumption, consider the households’ Euler equation
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for bond holdings
λt =e−β(t)RtEt [λt+1] (Euler eq. for Bonds)
Given the choice of preferences, in equilibrium, λt ≈ (ct/Γt−1−wtht/(1+ψ))−γ, implying
that consumption growth and changes in hours are positively related. Therefore all the
elements of the model causing the decline in hours are also responsible for the drop in
consumption in t+2. Consumption falls in period in t and t+1 because of lower anticipated
future income. Of course, in the case of an expectation-elastic risk premium, there is the
additional direct negative effect on consumption of a higher interest rate. Figure 2.3 shows
how in all variants of the model consumption falls in response to the news shock. The
reaction is the largest when all factors magnifying the decline in hours are present.
The response of net exports is positive as savings increase and investment falls. Figure
2.3 shows that this is true with and without expectation-elastic risk premium and with
and without predetermined labor. However, only in the version of the model with the
expectation-elastic risk premium and the associated large negative effect on investment is
the magnitude of the reaction roughly of the same order as in the data.
Figure 2.4 allows to assess the role of variable capacity utilization as an amplification
mechanism by plotting the model response for different values of the elasticity of depreci-
ation with respect to capital utilization ω. In order to maintain the calibrated depreciation
and utilization rate, I adjust the parameters δ and η correspondingly. The main effect of
higher values for ω is to dampen movements in the marginal product of labor and there-
fore in hours worked, GDP and consumption. At the same time, higher values for ω make
investment react more. The reason is that the effect on depreciation dominates the one on
the marginal product of capital. Overall, the return of capital tends to decrease more with
higher ω and a larger adjustment of investment is necessary to equalize returns on capital
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and bonds.
To summarize, in a small open economy model it is relatively easy to generate a re-
sponse to bad news about future productivity growth that is characterized by reductions in
real activity, employment, consumption and investment, together with an increase in net
exports. However, to obtain fluctuations of similar magnitude as during the Korean crisis,
all model features are important. Predetermined labor, the working capital constraint and
the expectation-elastic risk premium all contribute to obtaining large declines in hours, con-
sumption and real activity after the shock to expectations. For investment and net exports,
the expectation-elastic risk premium is the most important element of the model under the
present calibration. What value of the elasticity of marginal depreciation ω is better suited
to match the Korean experience is ambiguous. On the one hand, a lower ω contributes to
explaining the large decline in real activity, as well as the measured Solow residual dur-
ing Sudden Stops (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). On the other hand, a lower ω increases
the reliance on other factors to rationalize the observed fluctuations in investment and net
exports.
2.4.2 Changing the Shock to Expectations
This section explores how the model response to bad news is affected when the expecta-
tions dynamics are different from the benchmark calibration. Recall that three parameters
are key in determining the expectation dynamics: Productivity in the bad state µB, the prob-
ability that the bad state persists pBB, and the news precision q.
Figure 2.5 plots the response for the benchmark value of µB = 0.985, together with those for
µB = {0.97, 1}. The second and third column in Table 2.3 give the dynamics of expected
productivity growth for the new values. Lower values of µB imply larger drops in expected
productivity growth. The probabilities of the bad state are unchanged. For each value of
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µB, I change the elasticity of the risk premium χ2 to keep the response of the risk premium
in t+1 identical. The resulting values are χ2 = {0.53, 1.4} respectively. The main effect of
lowering µB is to enlarge the negative response of hours. The reason is that, since labor is
predetermined, lower expected productivity causes larger reductions in labor demand. As
a consequence, the reactions of output and consumption are also larger for lower values for
µB. The response of investment and net exports does not change dramatically, because the
reaction of the interest rate is unchanged.
Figure 2.6 plots the equilibrium paths when pBB = {0.5, 0.75}, together with the bench-
mark case of pBB = 0.25. The fourth and fifth column in Table 2.3 give the dynamics of
expected productivity growth for these values. The parameter pBB has only a negligible
effect on expected productivity in t +2, both in period t and period t +1. However, period
t + 2 expectations about growth in t + 3 are higher for larger pBB. The higher the persis-
tence of the bad technology state, the more the incorrect first news signal and the arrival of
a good signal about t +4 reduce the probability of the bad regime in t +3. Again, I adjust
the values for χ2 to obtain an identical response of the risk premium in t + 1 (to 0.73 and
0.72 respectively). The main change induced by an increase in the expected duration of the
bad state is in the reaction of investment and net exports. The response of hours and GDP is
only significantly affected in t +2 because of differences in the risk premium. The reason
is that, although labor is predetermined, adjusting the labor stock is not costly. Therefore
the firm’s optimal choice of labor input depends on the expectation of next period produc-
tivity. Adjustments of the capital stock, however, are costly, and the change in investment
is affected by expected productivity beyond the next period, and therefore by the expected
duration of the bad state. As a result, the response of investment in t and t + 1 is magni-
fied by higher values of pBB. There is also an effect on consumption. When the bad state
persistence is higher, expected future income is lower. Therefore consumption falls more
in period t and t+1 for higher pBB. Larger reductions in investment and consumption also
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cause bigger increases in net exports. This result establishes a second element of the model
that can explain the large reaction of investment and net exports during the Korean Crisis
besides the rise in the risk premium: If the bad state is more persistent, the fluctuations in
investment and net exports are considerably larger.
Finally, Figure 2.7 plots the response for two alternative values of the precision parameter,
q = {0.95, 1− ε}, where ε is an arbitrarily small number. The sixth and seventh column in
Table 2.3 provide the dynamics of expected productivity growth for these values. The main
effect of altering the value of q is a change in the probability of the bad technology state.
Higher values of q therefore lower expected productivity growth. Once more, I adjust the
values for χ2 to obtain the same response of the risk premium in t + 1 (to 1.51 and 0.70
respectively). Higher precision q magnifies the decline in hours, GDP and consumption in
t + 2. When the news signal is more precise, expectations in t + 2 about growth in t + 3
rely more on the t + 1 news signal and less on the state of technology or news in t + 2.
That is why the decline in expected productivity growth and the drop in economic activity
are more persistent in t + 3 for higher q. There is also a more subtle effect on the period
t response of consumption and investment. When the bad news shock arrives in period t,
agents put higher probability weight on the bad state occurring beyond t +2 if q is higher.
If the news signal is more precise and the bad state is persistent, the arrival of bad news
about t + 2 also increases the probability of bad news in t + 1 and of the bad technology
state in t +3. For instance, the period t probability of additional bad news in t +1 is 0.10
when q= 0.95, 0.14 when q= 0.99 and arbitrarily close to pBB when q= 1−ε. Because of
capital adjustment costs, the period t contraction in investment is larger when the precision
is higher.
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2.5 Conclusion
In their analysis of equilibrium models of Sudden Stops, Chari et al. (2005) challenge future
research to explore an alternative approach, in which: [...] private agents see events that
lead them to predict future drops in a country’s output, and as a result, these agents pull
their capital from the country. [...] anticipated output drops drive the Sudden Stops, rather
than the reverse. But [...], whether quantitative evidence can be found to support it is an
open issue. This paper provides quantitative evidence that an adverse shift in expectations
about future productivity growth can trigger a Sudden Stop and output drop. In a small open
economy that faces a peso problem in productivity growth states, a news shock announcing
a switch to a bad regime generates an increase in net exports and decreases in economic
activity, consumption and investment. To quantitatively match the 1998 Korean Crisis with
reasonable shifts in expectations, the model relies on several amplification mechanisms.
Predetermined labor input, variable capacity utilization and financial frictions contribute
most to explaining the large declines in hours, GDP and consumption for a given adjustment
in expectations. The financial friction and a larger expected duration of the bad regime are
the most important elements for generating large fluctuations in investment and net exports.
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Appendix: The Equilibrium Conditions
Define xˆt = xtΓt−1 . The solution of the model is obtained by finding approximations for cˆt ,
ht , yˆt , Vˆt , λt , ut , kˆt+1, dˆt+1 and xˆt as functions of the model’s state variables that solve the
following system of equations:
λt =Uc(t)−βc(t)e−β(t)Vˆt (2.14)
Vˆt = gtEt
[(
Uˆ(t +1)+ e−β(t+1)Vˆt+1
)]
(2.15)
0 = Et−1
[
λt
(
ζhψt Rt−1−gt(1−α)
(
ut kˆt
gtht
)α)]
(2.16)
ηuωt = α
(
ut kˆt
gtht
)α−1
(B.4)
λt = e−β(t)RtEt [λt+1] (2.17)
λt
(
1+φ
(
gt
kˆt+1
kˆt
−µ
))
= e−β(t)Et
λt+1
αut+1(ut+1kˆt+1gt+1ht+1
)α−1
+1−δ−η u
1+ω
t+1
1+ω
+Φ
(
kˆt+2
kˆt+1
)
(2.18)
gt kˆt+1 = xˆt +
(
1−δ−η u
1+ω
t
1+ω
)
kˆt − φ2
(
gt
kˆt+1
kˆt
−µ
)2
kˆt (2.19)
Rt−1dˆt + cˆt + xˆt = αyˆt +
(1−α)
Rt−1
yˆt +gt dˆt+1 (2.20)
yˆt = (ut kˆt)α(gtht)1−α (2.21)
where
Uˆ(t) =
(
cˆt −ζ h
1+ψ
t
1+ψ
)1−γ
1− γ , Uc(t) =
(
cˆt −ζ h
1+ψ
t
1+ψ
)−γ
, Rt = ρχ1 (1+Et [gt+1]−µ)−χ2
βc(t) = ξ
(
1+ cˆt −ζ h
1+ψ
t
1+ψ
)−1
, Φ
(
kˆt+2
kˆt+1
)
= φ
(
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kˆt+2
kˆt+1
−µ
)
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kˆt+2
kˆt+1
− φ
2
(
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kˆt+1
−µ
)2
.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Timing of Events in the Model
(t−1)+
t− shocks are revealed;
firms rent capital and issue bonds at rate Rt−1
t+ firms produce and decide on period t +1 labor input;
bonds issued in (t−1)+ and t− mature;
households consume, invest and trade bonds at rate Rt
(t +1)−
Table 2.2: Benchmark Parameter Values
Technology
α 0.36 Labor input elasticity of output
δ −0.026 Capital depreciation parameter
η 0.078 Capital depreciation parameter
ω 0.05 Utilization elasticity of marginal depreciation
φ 2.5 Capital adjustment cost parameter
µ 1.019 Semiannual productivity growth factor
Household Preferences
ψ 0.45 Inverse wage elasticity of labor supply
ξ 0.061 Elasticity of discount factor
γ 2 Coefficient of relative risk aversion
Interest Rate
ρ 1.050.5 World riskless interest rate
χ1 1.010.5 Country risk premium parameter
χ2 0.76 Elasticity of country risk premium
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Figure 2.2: The Korean Crisis and the Model Response to News Shock in 1997:2. The
Vertical Line Marks the Period of the Shock.
GDP, consumption and investment are year on year growth rates. Hours worked is in percentage deviations
from the 1996:1 value. Data Sources: GDP: Gross domestic product at constant prices, quarterly levels,
OECD ; Investment: Gross Fixed Capital Formation, quarterly levels, OECD ; Consumption: Private
plus Government Final Consumption Expenditure at constant prices , quarterly levels, OECD ; Hours
Worked: Total Employment Multiplied by Weekly Hours per Employee in Non-Agricultural Activities,
ILO; Risk Premium: EMBI Global Spread Korea, JP Morgan, obtained from Neumeyer et al. (2005);
Net Exports/GDP: obtained from Neumeyer et al. (2005). All variables are seasonally adjusted by the
publishing agency, except for weekly hours and employment, which I seasonally adjusted using the Census
Bureau’s X12 method.
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Figure 2.3: Response to News Shock in Different Models. The Vertical Line Marks the
Period of the Shock.
GDP, consumption and investment are year on year growth rates. Hours worked and the rate of capacity
utilization are in percentage deviations from the 1996:1 value.
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ω=0.05 (Benchmark) ω=0.5 ω=1
Figure 2.4: Model Response to News Shock: Different Values for ω. The Vertical Line
Marks the Period of the Shock.
GDP, consumption and investment are year on year growth rates. Hours worked and the rate of capacity
utilization are in percentage deviations from the 1996:1 value.
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µ
B
=0.985 (Benchmark) µ
B
=0.97 µ
B
=1
Figure 2.5: Model Response to News Shock: Different Values for µB. The Vertical Line
Marks the Period of the Shock.
GDP, consumption and investment are year on year growth rates. Hours worked and the rate of capacity
utilization are in percentage deviations from the 1996:1 value.
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p
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=0.25 (Benchmark) p
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=0.50 p
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=0.75
Figure 2.6: Model Response to News Shock: Different Values for pBB. The Vertical Line
Marks the Period of the Shock.
GDP, consumption and investment are year on year growth rates. Hours worked and the rate of capacity
utilization are in percentage deviations from the 1996:1 value.
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q=0.99 (Benchmark) q=0.95 q =1−ε
Figure 2.7: Model Response to News Shock: Different Values for q. The Vertical Line
Marks the Period of the Shock.
GDP, consumption and investment are year on year growth rates. Hours worked and the rate of capacity
utilization are in percentage deviations from the 1996:1 value.
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3.1 Introduction
Structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) are a widely used tool in empirical macroeco-
nomics, particularly for the evaluation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models.1 The results from SVARs are often viewed as stylized facts that economic models
should replicate. However, there is some debate whether SVARs can in practice discrim-
inate between competing DSGE models and whether their sampling properties are good
enough to justify their popularity in applied macroeconomics. In response to a seminal pa-
per by Gali (1999), the discussion has focused on the impact of technology shocks on hours
worked, identified using restrictions on the long-run impact matrix of the structural errors.
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson (2006)
investigate the properties of the estimators based on SVARs by simulating an artificial data
generating process (DGP) derived from a prototype real business cycle (RBC) model and
by comparing true with estimated impulse responses.
According to Chari et al. (2005), long-run identified SVARs fail dramatically for both
a level and difference specification of hours worked. Even with a correct specification of
the integration properties of the series, the SVAR overestimates in most cases the impact
of technology on labor and the estimates display high variability. However, Christiano et
al. (2006) argue that the parametrization chosen by Chari et al. (2005) is not very realistic.
With their preferred parametrization, Christiano et al. (2006) find that both long-run and
short-run identification schemes display only small biases and argue that, on average, the
confidence intervals produced by SVARs correctly reflect the degree of sampling uncer-
tainty.2 Nevertheless, they also find that the estimates obtained via a long-run identification
1Examples in the literature are, among many others, Blanchard and Quah (1989), as well as King, Plosser,
Stock and Watson (1991), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Gali (1999).
2In addition, Christiano et al. (2006) find that short-run identification schemes work much better compared
to identification via long-run restrictions.
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scheme are very imprecise. These results have been further confirmed by Erceg, Guerrieri
and Gust (2005). In the end, with long-run restrictions, it is often very difficult to even
make a correct inference about the sign of the structural impulse responses. The question
is therefore if one should use this type of identification scheme at all. However, long-run
identification is attractive from a theoretical point of view, since it requires much weaker
assumptions than short-run identification and is in any case a useful additional tool for
model evaluation.
The failure of finite-order SVARs is sometimes attributed to the fact that they are only
approximations to infinite-order VAR processes or to the possibility that there does not ex-
ist a VAR representation at all. For example, Cooley and Dwyer (1998) give an example of
an economic model that implies a vector autoregressive moving-average (VARMA) repre-
sentation of the data series and state: “While VARMA models involve additional estimation
and identification issues, these complications do not justify systematically ignoring these
moving average components, as in the SVAR approach”. As further shown by Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde et al. (Forthcoming), DSGE models generally imply a state space system that
has a VARMA and eventually an infinite VAR representation. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et
al. (Forthcoming) propose the inclusion of moving-average terms if the DSGE model at
hand does not permit an infinite VAR representation. Christiano et al. (2006) state that
“Given our data generating processes, the true VAR of the data has infinite lags. However,
the econometrician can only use a finite number of lags in the estimation procedure. The
resulting specification error is the reason why in some of our examples the sum of VAR
coefficients is difficult to estimate accurately”.
This paper explores the possible advantages of structural VARMA and state space mod-
els that capture the full structure of the time series representation implied by DSGE models,
while imposing minimal theoretical assumptions. We investigate whether estimators based
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on these alternative models can outperform SVARs in finite samples.3 This question is
important for several reasons. First, it is useful to find out to what extent the poor per-
formance of SVARs in these simulation studies is due to the omission of moving-average
components. Second, whether estimators based on alternative representations of the same
DGP have good sampling properties is interesting in itself. Employing these alternatives
enables researchers to quantify the robustness of their results by comparing different esti-
mates.
In order to assess whether the inclusion of a moving-average component leads to im-
portant improvements, we stick to the research design of Chari et al. (2005) and Christiano
et al. (2006): We simulate DSGE models and fit different reduced form models to recover
the structural shocks using the same long-run identification strategy. We then compare
the performance of the models by focusing on the estimated contemporaneous impact to a
technology shock. We employ a variety of estimation algorithms for the VARMA models,
and both a prediction error method and a subspace algorithm for the state space models.
One of the findings is that one can indeed perform better by taking the full structure of
the DGP into account: While the algorithms for VARMA models and the prediction error
method do not perform significantly better (and sometimes worse), the subspace algorithm
for state space models consistently outperforms SVARs in terms of mean squared error.
Unfortunately, we also find that even these alternative estimators are highly variable and
are therefore not necessarily much more informative for discriminating between different
DSGE models. One of the implications is that SVARs do not perform poorly in these sim-
ulation studies because they are only finite-order approximations. Given the properties of
the data generating process, the disappointing performance of SVARs is most likely due to
3McGrattan (2006) is closely related to our paper. In a similar setting, McGrattan (2006) also investigates
whether state space or VARMA models with minimal structural assumptions can uncover statistics of interest.
Her work focusses on different business cycle statistics, while we are exclusively concerned with classical
structural estimation.
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the fact that the long-run identification approach is inappropriate with small samples.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the RBC model
used by Chari et al. (2005) and Christiano et al. (2006) that serves as the basis for our
Monte Carlo simulations. In section 3 we discuss the different statistical representations of
the observed data series. In section 4 we present the specification and estimation procedures
and the results from the Monte Carlo simulations. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 The Data Generating Process
The DGP for the simulations is based on a simple RBC model taken from Chari et al.
(2005). In the model, a technology shock is the only shock that affects labor productivity
in the long-run, which is the crucial identifying assumption made by Gali (1999) to assess
the role of technology shocks in the business cycle.
Households choose infinite sequences, {Ct , Lt , Kt+1 }∞t=0, of per capita consumption,
labor and capital to maximize expected lifetime utility
E0
∞
∑
t=0
[β(1+ γ)]t
[
logCt +ψ
(1−Lt)1−σ−1
1−σ
]
, (3.1)
given an initial capital stock K0, and subject to a set of budget constraints given by
Ct +(1+ τx)((1+ γ)Kt+1− (1−δ)Kt)≤ (1− τlt)wtLt + rtKt +Tt , (3.2)
for t = 0,1,2, ..., where wt is the wage, rt is the rental rate of capital, Tt are lump-sum
government transfers and τlt is an exogenous labor tax. The parameters include the discount
factor β ∈ (0,1), the labor supply parameters, ψ > 0 and σ > 0, the deprecation rate δ ∈
(0,1), the population growth rate γ > 0 and a constant investment tax τx. The production
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technology is
Yt = Kαt (XtLt)
1−α , (3.3)
where Xt reflects labor-augmenting technological progress and α ∈ (0,1) is the capital
income share. Competitive firms maximize Yt−wtLt−rtKt . Finally, the resource constraint
is
Yt ≥Ct +(1+ γ)Kt+1− (1−δ)Kt . (3.4)
The model contains two exogenous shocks, a technology shock and a tax shock, which
follow the stochastic processes
logXt+1 = µ+ logXt +σxεx,t+1 , (3.5a)
τlt+1 = (1−ρ)τ¯l +ρτlt +σlεl,t+1 , (3.5b)
where εx,t and εl,t are independent random variables with mean zero and unit standard
deviation and σx > 0 and σl > 0 are scalars. µ > 0 is the mean growth rate of technology,
τ¯l > 0 is the mean labor tax and ρ ∈ (0,1) measures the persistence of the tax process.
Hence, the model has two independent shocks: a unit root process in technology and a
stationary AR(1) process in the labor tax.
3.3 Statistical Representations
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (Forthcoming) show how the solution of a detrended, log-
linearized DSGE model leads to different statistical representations of the model-generated
data. This section presents several alternative ways to write down a statistical model for the
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bivariate, stationary time series
yt =
∆ log(Yt/Lt)
log(Lt)
 . (3.6)
Labor productivity growth ∆ log(Yt/Lt) and hours worked log(Lt) are also the series an-
alyzed by Gali (1999), as well as Chari et al. (2005) and Christiano et al. (2006). The
Appendix provides more detail on the derivations. Given the log-linearized solution of the
RBC model of the previous section, we can write down the law of motion of the logs
logkt+1 = φ1+φ11 logkt −φ11 logxt +φ12τt , (3.7a)
logyt − logLt = φ2+φ21 logkt −φ21 logxt +φ22τt , (3.7b)
logLt = φ3+φ31 logkt −φ31 logxt +φ32τt , (3.7c)
where kt = Kt/Xt+1 and yt = Yt/Xt are capital and output detrended with the unit-root
shock and the φ’s are the coefficients of the calculated policy rules. Following Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde et al. (Forthcoming) the system can be written in state space form. The state
transition equation is
 logkt+1
τt
 = K1+A
 logkt
τt−1
+B
 εx,t
εlt
 , (3.8)
xt+1 = K1+Axt +Bεt ,
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and the observation equation is
 ∆ log(Yt/Lt)
logLt
 = K2+C
 logkt
τt−1
+D
 εx,t
εlt
 , (3.9)
yt = K2+Cxt +Dεt ,
where K1,A,B,K2,C and D are constant matrices that depend on the coefficients of the
policy rules and therefore on the “deep” parameters of the model. The state vector is given
by xt = [logkt , τt−1]′ and the noise vector is εt = [εxt , εlt ]′. Note that the system has a state
vector of dimension two with the logarithm of detrended capital and the tax rate shock as
state components.
The above state space system is still a structural model, since the formulation contains
the non-observable state vector and the structural errors. We now show different represen-
tations of the system for yt , which can be estimated in practice. Given certain invertibility
conditions on the system matrices, A,B,C,D, there is an infinite VAR representation:
yt = K3+C
(
I− (A−BD−1C)L)−1 BD−1yt−1+Dεt , (3.10)
or
yt = K3+
∞
∑
i=1
Πiyt−i+ut , (3.11)
where K3 and Πi, i = 1,2, . . . are constant coefficient matrices, L denotes the lag operator, I
denotes an identity matrix of suitable dimensions, ut =Dεt and ut ∼ iid N(0,Σu), Σu =DD′,
where Σu is the covariance matrix of ut . Note that a condition for the existence of an infinite
VAR representation is that the eigenvalues of (A−BD−1C) are strictly less than one in
modulus. In practice, it is only possible to approximate this structure by a finite-order
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VAR.
Alternatively, the system can be written as a state space model in “innovations form”:
xt+1 = K1+Axt +Kut , (3.12)
yt = K2+Cxt +ut ,
where the innovation, ut , is defined as above and K = BD−1. In contrast to the VAR
representation in (3.10), it is possible to estimate (3.12) exactly.
Finally, the underlying DGP can be represented by a VARMA(1,1) representation:
yt = K4+CAC−1yt−1+
(
D+(CB−CAC−1D)L)εt , (3.13)
yt = K4+A1yt−1+ut +M1ut−1 ,
where the last equation defines A1,M1 and ut is defined as above. As with the state space
representation, the VARMA(1,1) representation can also be estimated exactly.
Given the conditions stated in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (Forthcoming), all three rep-
resentations are algebraically equivalent. That is, given the same input sequence {εt},
they produce the same output sequence {yt}. The representations are however not statis-
tically equivalent: the properties of estimators and tests depend on the chosen statistical
representation. It should be emphasized that we are always interested in the same process
and ultimately in the estimation of the same coefficients, i.e. those associated with the
first-period response of yt to a unit shock in εx,t to the technology process. However, the
different representations give rise to different estimation algorithms and therefore our study
can be regarded as a comparison of different algorithms to estimate the same linear system.
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3.4 The Monte Carlo Experiment
3.4.1 Monte Carlo Design and Econometric Techniques
To investigate the properties of the various estimators, we simulate 1000 samples of the
vector series yt in linearized form and transform log-deviations to values in log-levels. As
in the previous Monte Carlo studies, the sample size is 180 quarters. We use two differ-
ent sets of parameter values: The first is due to Chari et al. (2005) and is referred to as
the CKM-specification, while the second is the one used by Christiano et al. (2006) and
is labeled the KP-specification, referring to estimates obtained by Prescott (1986).4 The
specific parameter values are given in Table 3.1 for the CKM and KP benchmark specifica-
tions. Christiano et al. (2006) show that the key difference between the specifications is the
implied fraction of the variability in hours worked that is due to technology shocks. Table
3.1 also provides the eigenvalues of the autoregressive and moving-average matrices of the
corresponding VARMA representations, together with the eigenvalues of the Kalman gain
K. In terms of these values, the time series properties are very similar and indicate why the
estimation of both systems could be difficult. Note that the moving-average part is not of
full rank and the associated eigenvalue is close to unity in modulus. Also, the eigenvalues
of the autoregressive part are close to one and close to the eigenvalue of the moving-average
part in modulus. The fact that one eigenvalue of the moving-average part is close to one
eigenvalue of the autoregressive part could imply that the VARMA(1,1) representation is
close to being not identified (Klein et al., 2005).
To check the robustness of our results, we also consider variations of the benchmark
models. As in Christiano et al. (2006), we consider different values for the preference
4Both parameterizations are obtained by maximum likelihood estimation of the theoretical model, using
time series on productivity and hours worked in the US. However, because of differences in approach, both
papers obtain different estimates.
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parameter σ and the standard deviation of the labor tax, σl . These variations change the
fraction of the business cycle variability that is due to technology shocks. The different
values for σ are reported in Table 3.2. For the CKM specification, we also consider cases
where σl assumes a fraction of the original benchmark value.
Turning to the issue of identification, consider the following infinite moving-average
representation of yt in terms of ut :
yt =
∞
∑
i=0
Φu,iut−i = Φu(L)ut , (3.14)
where we abstract from the intercept term and Φu(L) is a lag polynomial, Φu(L)=∑∞i=0 Φu,iLi.
Analogously, we can represent yt in terms of the structural errors using the relation ut =
Dεt :
yt =
∞
∑
i=0
Φu,iDεt−i = Φε(L)εt , (3.15)
where Φε(L) = ∑∞i=0 Φu,iDLi. The former lag polynomial, evaluated at one,
Φu(1) = I+Φu,1+Φu,2+ . . . (3.16)
is the long-run impact matrix of the reduced form error ut . Note that the existence of
this infinite sum depends on the stationarity of the series. If the stationarity requirement
is violated or “nearly” violated, then the long-run identification scheme is not valid or
may face difficulties. Also note that the matrix D defined in section 3.3 gives the first-
period impact of a unit shock in εt . Using the above relations, we know that Φε(1) =
Φu(1)D and further Σu =DD′, where Φε(1) is the long-run impact matrix of the underlying
structural errors. The identifying restriction on Φε(1) is that only the technology shock
has a permanent effect on labor productivity. This restriction implies that in our bivariate
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system the long-run impact matrix is triangular,
Φε(1) =
Φ11 0
Φ21 Φ22
 , (3.17)
and it is assumed that Φ11 > 0. Using Φε(1)Φ′ε(1) = Φu(1)ΣuΦ′u(1) we can obtain Φε(1)
from the Cholesky decomposition of Φu(1)ΣuΦ′u(1). The contemporaneous impact matrix
can be recovered from D = [Φu(1)]−1Φε(1). Correspondingly, the estimated versions are
Φˆε(1) = chol[Φˆu(1)Σ̂uΦˆ′u(1)] , (3.18a)
Dˆ = [Φˆu(1)]−1Φˆε(1) . (3.18b)
Only the first column of Dˆ is identified and is our estimate of the first-period impact of the
technology shock.
Next, we comment on the estimation techniques. First, note that for each representation
there are several possible estimation methods. We chose algorithms that are both popular
in the literature and known to work well in general. Of course, it is possible that there
are algorithms that work slightly better for one of the representations in the current set-
ting. However, the aim of this study is primarily to quantify whether the inclusion of the
moving-average term alone leads to important gains in terms of more precise estimates of
the structural parameters.
Vector Autoregressive Models. VARs are well known, so we comment only on a few is-
sues. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (Forthcoming) show that for the CKM-specification there
exists an infinite VAR representation. We verified that the same is true for the benchmark
KP-specification. As in the previous Monte Carlo studies, the VAR lag length is set at
four. However, for different sets of parameter values a VAR with different lags may yield
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slightly better results. We have chosen to stick to the VAR(4) because we want to facilitate
comparison with the results of Christiano et al. (2006) and because there was no lag order
that performed uniformly better for all DGPs.
State Space Models. There are many ways to estimate a state space model, e.g., the
Kalman-based maximum likelihood methods and subspace identification methods such as
N4SID of Van Overschee and De Moor (1994) or the CCA method of Larimore (1983).
An obvious candidate is maximum likelihood. Therefore, we included a prediction error
method that is implemented with the PEM routine in the MATLAB system identification
toolbox. However, it is well-known that maximum likelihood methods can face numerical
problems that are due to the dependence on starting values, nonlinear optimization or local
maxima. Indeed, these problems also apply to our setting. Therefore, we also use the CCA
subspace algorithm that is asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood and was previ-
ously found to be remarkably accurate in small samples. As argued in Bauer (2005), CCA
might be the best algorithm for econometric applications. The idea of subspace methods is
that the state, xt , summarizes all information of the past that can be used for mean square
prediction. Thus, the center of attention is the state that is estimated in a first step. In a sec-
ond step the coefficient matrices are estimated by OLS. The different subspace algorithms
use the structure of the state space representation in various ways. See Bauer (2005) for a
more general introduction to subspace methods and the Appendix for a detailed description
of the algorithm that is employed in this paper.
While implementing the algorithm, we chose the correct dimension of the state vector,
n = 2.5 To calculate the long-run effect of the prediction errors, it is necessary to solve the
5There are two auxiliary parameters in the subspace algorithm, f , p, which determine the row and column
dimension of a Hankel matrix which is estimated in an intermediate step (see Bauer (2005) and the Appendix).
They have been set to f = p = 8. These parameters are of no importance asymptotically as long as they
increase at certain rates with the sample size. In the literature it has been suggested to set f = p= 2pˆ where
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state space equations xt+1 = Axt +Kut , yt =Cxt +ut , where the deterministic component
is omitted. The lag polynomial of the infinite moving-average representation is given by
Φu(L) = I+
∞
∑
j=0
CA jL j+1K = I+LC(I−LA)−1K . (3.19)
An estimate of the long-run impact matrix Φu(1) can be obtained from the estimated system
matrices, Φˆu(1) = I + Cˆ(I− Aˆ)−1Kˆ. Henceforth, the estimation of the contemporaneous
impact matrix is entirely analogous to long-run identification in a standard VAR setting.
That is, we recover Φε(1) by a Cholesky decomposition and then obtain an estimate of D.
Vector Autoregressive Moving-Average Models. The VARMA representation given in
(3.13) implies that we can represent yt in terms of the innovations as
yt = (I−A1L)−1(I+M1L)ut = A(L)−1M(L)ut , (3.20)
where A(L) and M(L) are the autoregressive polynomial and the moving-average polyno-
mial, respectively, and the intercept term has been omitted. The long-run impact of ut is
given by Φu(1) = A(1)−1M(1) and D can be recovered as before. The representation in
(3.13) is however not the most useful representation in practice. It is more useful to choose
a specific representation which guarantees that all parameters are identified and the number
of estimated parameters is minimal. For an introduction to the identification problem in
VARMA models see Lu¨tkepohl (2005). Here we employ a final moving-average (FMA)
representation that can be derived analogously to the final equation form (Dufour et al.,
2002). In our case, this results in a VARMA (2,1) representation in final moving-average
pˆ is the order of the chosen autoregressive approximation Bauer (2005).
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form (see Appendix).6
As in the case of state space models there are many different estimation methods for
VARMA models. Examples are the methods developed by Hannan and Rissanen (1982),
Koreisha and Pukkila (1990), Mauricio (1997) or Kapetanios (2003). We report results for
a simple two-stage least squares method as in Hannan and Rissanen (1982), an iterative
least squares estimation algorithm proposed by Kapetanios (2003) and the three-stage pro-
cedure developed by Hannan and Kavalieris (1984). The two-stage least squares method
starts with an initial “long” autoregression in order to estimate the unobserved residuals.
The estimated residuals are then plugged into equation (3.13) and a (generalized) least
squares regression is performed. The iterative least squares procedure takes these estimates
as initial parameters and uses them to computes new residuals which are again used in a
second least squares regression in order to update the parameter estimates. The updated
parameter estimates are then used to update the residual estimates and so on, until con-
vergence. The last algorithm is regression-based and is the first step of a Gauss-Newton
procedure for the maximization of the likelihood, conditional on initial values. First, a
high-order VAR is fitted to get initial estimates of the innovations. In the second stage
these estimates are used to estimate the autoregressive and moving-average parameters by
least squares. In the third stage the estimated coefficients are used to form new residuals
and the coefficient estimates from the second stage are refined (see, e.g. Hannan and Kava-
lieris (1984) or Hannan and Deistler (1988)). In the Appendix we provide further details
on the estimation algorithms. We use a VAR with lag length nT = 0.5
√
T for the initial
long autoregression.7
6We experimented with other identified representations such as the final equation representation or the
Echelon representation. However, the final moving-average representation always yielded the best results.
7We also tried full information maximum likelihood maximization as, for example, in Mauricio (1997).
However, this procedure proved to be highly unstable and was therefore not considered to be a practical
alternative. One likely reason is that the roots of the AR and the MA polynomials are all close to the unit
circle.
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3.4.2 Results of the Monte Carlo Study
Table 3.2 summarizes the results of the Monte Carlo simulation study. We tabulate Monte
Carlo means and standard deviations of the estimates of the contemporaneous impact of
a technology shock on productivity and hours worked for the various estimators. We also
tabulate the MSE of the different estimators relative to the MSE of the estimator resulting
from the benchmark SVAR. For the VARMA algorithms the estimation method is indi-
cated in parenthesis, where 2SLS refers to the two-stage least squares method and ILS and
3SLS refer to the iterative least squares algorithm and the Hannan-Kavalieris method, re-
spectively. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 depict the average estimated impulse responses of hours
worked, together with the true impulse responses for the SVAR and the CCA subspace
algorithm. In the figures, the bands around the mean lines correspond to the 0.025% and
0.975% quantiles of the estimated impulse responses at each point of time.
Our SVAR results confirm the findings of both Christiano et al. (2006) and Chari et
al. (2005). While the SVAR is unbiased for the KP-specification (first row in Table 3.2),
the same is not true for the CKM-specification (fourth row in Table 3.2). The associated
pictures for both parameterizations show that the 95% bands around the mean impulse
responses comprise a large region ranging from negative values to very high positive values.
Also, for the different variations of the benchmark model we find that the SVAR is often
biased and/or displays high variability. As can be seen from row 2, 3, 5 and 6 in Table
3.2, both the biases and standard deviations are larger for the models with higher Frisch
elasticities of labor supply (lower σ), as in the model this decreases the proportion of the
variation in hours worked that is due to the technology shock. From row 7 and 8 it is clear
that reducing the relative importance of the tax shock by lowering σl by 1/2 and 1/3 reduces
the bias and the standard deviations.
The algorithms based on the state space representation perform quite differently. The
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PEM routine performs uniformly worse for all sets of parameter values. Although, in con-
trast to the SVAR, the state space model nests the DSGE model, the small sample perfor-
mance of this estimation algorithm is much poorer. The low accuracy of the PEM routine
can be attributed to the near non-stationarity and non-invertibility of the series that cause
difficulties for the optimization procedure. The results of the PEM routine illustrate that
using a formally exact representation of the DGP does not automatically lead to more pre-
cise estimates because the associated estimation algorithm may be numerically unreliable
or not robust to the near violation of the underlying assumptions. For the CCA subspace
algorithm, however, we find that the associated MSE of the estimated first-period impulse
response is almost uniformly lower for both series and across different specifications. Only
in two cases does the MSE of the CCA-based estimates exceed the MSE of the SVAR,
and only by a very small amount. In particular, the first-period impact on hours worked is
estimated more precisely up to a relative reduction to 85% in terms of MSE for the KP-
specification. Figure 3.1 shows that the 95% interval is narrower for the estimated state
space model, but still rather wide. In almost all cases the bias is at least slightly reduced.
Although the response of hours worked is usually estimated more precisely, the perfor-
mances of the subspace algorithm and the SVAR seem to be related: in cases where the
SVAR does poorly, the state space model does so too. The advantage of the CCA algo-
rithm over the SVAR-based least squares algorithm should be due to the use of the more
general state space representation.8
The results for the different algorithms based on the VARMA representation are either
similar to or worse than those for the VAR approximation. Generally, the less sophisticated
methods give better results than the more complex estimation algorithms. Improvements in
terms of bias are compromised by increases in variance and a higher MSE. The reason for
8It is also worth mentioning that since the CCA algorithm is based on OLS regressions, it is computation-
ally not more intensive than a VAR. The same is not true for the PEM routine and most VARMA estimation
algorithms.
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this pattern is that we face an ill-conditioned problem that cannot be remedied by rescaling
the data because of the presence of eigenvalues close to the unit circle of both the autore-
gressive and moving-average parts. Furthermore, the roots of the moving-average part and
the autoregressive part imply that the model is close to being not identified. The iterative
least squares method and the Hannan-Kavalieris method face consequently more problems
than the simple two-stage least squares method. In comparison to the SVAR model, the
structural estimates obtained from the VARMA algorithms perform relatively well in esti-
mating the impact on hours worked, but worse in estimating the response of productivity
to a technology shock. While the VARMA model fully nests the underlying DGP, this
representation is not very efficient in our context.
A problem common to all algorithms is that the stationarity requirement is nearly vio-
lated for the DGPs at hand. As we have seen in section 3.4.1, the stationarity assumption
lies at the heart of the long-run identification scheme. However, as the eigenvalues in Table
3.1 indicate, this assumption is nearly violated for the benchmark models. This problem
is independent of the chosen representation and, therefore, does not vanish even when we
control for omitted moving-average terms. Apart from problems specific to the algorithms,
this common problem may explain the relatively weak performance of all algorithms - a
problem that could be overcome in larger samples.9
3.5 Conclusions
There has been some debate whether long-run identified SVARs can in practice discrim-
inate between competing DSGE models and whether their sampling properties are good
enough to justify their widespread use. Several Monte Carlo studies indicate that SVARs
9Our estimation results are in line with the findings of McGrattan (2006). However, McGrattan (2006)
stresses the need to impose more theoretical restrictions to obtain informative statistics from empirical mod-
els.
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based on long-run restrictions are often biased and usually imprecise. Some authors have
suggested that SVARs do poorly because they are only approximate representations of the
underlying DGPs. Therefore, we replicate the simulation experiments of Chari et al. (2005)
and Christiano et al. (2006) and apply more general models to their simulated data. In par-
ticular, we use algorithms based on VARMA and state space representations of the data and
compare the resulting estimates of the underlying structural model. For our simulations,
we find that one can do better by taking the full structure of the DGP into account. While
our VARMA-based estimation algorithms and the prediction error algorithm for state space
models are not found to do significantly better and often even worse, the CCA subspace
algorithm seems to consistently outperform the SVAR. However, the estimates display high
variability and are often biased, regardless of the reduced form model used. Furthermore,
the performances of the different estimators are strongly correlated. This finding suggests
that long-run identified SVARs do not fail because they are simple finite-order approxi-
mations. Instead, we find that the simulated processes are nearly violating the most basic
assumptions on which long-run identification schemes are based. Given these properties of
the data series, the poor performance seems almost entirely a small sample problem in this
type of simulation studies.
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Appendix: Final MA Equation Form
Consider a standard representation for a stationary and invertible VARMA process
A(L)yt = M(L)ut . (3.21)
Recall that M−1(L) =M∗(L)/|M(L)|, where M∗(L) denotes the adjoint of M(L) and |M(L)|
its determinant. We can multiply the above equation with M∗(L) to get
M∗(L)A(L)yt = |M(L)|ut . (3.22)
This representation therefore places restrictions on the moving-average polynomial which
is required to be a scalar operator, |M(L)|. Dufour and Pelletier (2002) show that this re-
striction leads to an identified representation. More specifically, consider the VARMA(1,1)
representation in (3.13). Since the moving-average part is not of full rank we can write the
system as
1−a11L −a12L
−a21L 1−a22L
yt =
1+m11L αm11L
m21L 1+αm21L
ut , (3.23)
where α is some constant not equal to zero.
Clearly, det(M(L)) = 1+(m11+αm21)L and we can write
1+αm21L −αm11L
−m21L 1+αm11L

1−a11L −a12L
−a21L 1−a22L
yt = [1+(m11+αm21)L]ut . (3.24)
Because of the reduced rank we end up with a VARMA (2,1). Note that the moving-average
part is indeed restricted to be a scalar operator.
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Appendix: Statistical Representations
This section elaborates on the derivation of the infinite VAR, VARMA and state space rep-
resentations that result from our DSGE model in order to get an insight into the relationship
between the economic model and the implied time series properties.
Consider again the law of motion of the logs
logkt+1 = φ1+φ11 logkt −φ11 logxt +φ12τt , (3.25a)
logyt − logLt = φ2+φ21 logkt −φ21 logxt +φ22τt , (3.25b)
logLt = φ3+φ31 logkt −φ31 logxt +φ32τt , (3.25c)
and the exogenous states
logxt+1 = µ+σxεx,t+1 , (3.26a)
τt+1 = (1−ρ)τ¯l +ρτt +σlεl,t+1 . (3.26b)
From these equations the state space representation can be derived as follows. First write
down the law of motion of labor productivity in differences:
∆ log(Yt/Lt) = logxt +φ21∆ logkt −φ21∆ logxt +φ22∆τt . (3.27)
Thus the observed series can be expressed as
∆ log(Yt/Lt) = φ21 logkt −φ21 logkt−1+(1−φ21) logxt (3.28a)
+φ21 logxt−1+φ22τt −φ22τt−1 ,
logLt = φ3+φ31 logkt −φ31 logxt +φ32τt . (3.28b)
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Next, rewrite the law of motion for capital as
logkt−1 =−φ−111 φ1+φ−111 logkt + logxt−1−φ−111 φ12τt−1 , (3.29)
in order to substitute for capital at time t−1:
∆ log(Yt/Lt) = φ21φ−111 φ1+φ21(1−φ−111 ) logkt (3.30)
+(1−φ21) logxt +φ22τt +(φ21φ−111 φ12−φ22)τt−1 .
Using the laws of motion for the stochastic shock processes, substitute the current ex-
ogenous shocks to get
∆ log(Yt/Lt) =
[
φ21φ−111 φ1+(1−φ21)µ+φ22(1−ρ)τ¯l
]
+φ21(1−φ−111 ) logkt(3.31a)
+(φ21φ−111 φ12− (1−ρ)φ22)τt−1+(1−φ21)σxεx,t +φ22σlεl,t ,
logLt = [φ3−φ31µ+φ32(1−ρ)τ¯l]+φ31 logkt +φ32ρτt−1 (3.31b)
−φ31σxεx,t +φ32σlεl,t .
Next, consider the law of motion for capital and express future capital in terms of the
current states as
logkt+1 = [φ1−φ11µ+φ12(1−ρ)τ¯l]+φ11 logkt +φ12ρτt−1 (3.32)
−φ11σxεx,t +φ12σlεl,t .
Collecting the above equations, the system can be written in state space form according
to Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramı´rez, Watson and Sargent (Forthcoming). The state
transition equation is
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 logkt+1
τt
= K1+A
 logkt
τt−1
+B
 εx,t
εlt
 , (3.33)
where the system matrices are given by
K1 =
 φ1−φ11µ+φ12(1−ρ)τ¯l
(1−ρ)τ¯
 ,
A =
 φ11 φ12ρ
0 ρ
 ,
and
B =
 −φ11σx φ12σl
0 σl
 .
The observation equation is
 ∆ log(Yt/Lt)
logLt
= K2+C
 logkt
τt−1
+D
 εx,t
εlt
 , (3.34)
with system matrices
K2 =
 φ21φ−111 φ1+(1−φ21)µ+φ22(1−ρ)τ¯l
φ3−φ31µ+φ32(1−ρ)τ¯l
 ,
C =
 φ21(1−φ−111 ) φ21φ−111 φ12− (1−ρ)φ22
φ31 φ32ρ
 ,
Chapter 3: Business Cycle Analysis and VARMA models 123
and
D =
 (1−φ21)σx φ22σl
−φ31σx φ32σl
 .
This representation permits us to derive the infinite VAR and VARMA representation in
compact form.
Let yt denote the vector of observables, xt the vector of states, and ε the white noise
shocks. Then we have as above
xt+1 = K1+Axt +Bεt , (3.35a)
yt = K2+Cxt +Dεt . (3.35b)
If D is invertible, it is possible to use εt = D−1 (yt −K2−Cxt) in the transition equation to
obtain
xt+1 = K1+Axt +BD−1(yt −K2−Cxt) , (3.36a)
(I− (A−BD−1C)L)xt+1 = [K1−BD−1K2]+BD−1yt . (3.36b)
If the eigenvalues of (A−BD−1C) are strictly less than one in modulus we can solve for
xt+1:
xt+1 =
(
I− (A−BD−1C)L)−1 ([K1−BD−1K2]+BD−1yt) . (3.37)
Using this relation in the observation equation yields the infinite VAR representation for yt :
yt = K2+C
(
I− (A−BD−1C)L)−1 ([K1−BD−1K2]+BD−1yt−1)+Dεt , (3.38)
yt = K3+C
(
I− (A−BD−1C)L)−1 BD−1yt−1+Dεt .
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Note that the condition for the existence of an infinite VAR-representation is that I− (A−
BD−1C) is invertible. If this condition does not hold, impulse responses from a VAR are
unlikely to match up those from the model.
If C is invertible, it is possible to rewrite the state as xt =C−1 (yt −K2−Dεt) and use
it in the transition equation:
C−1 (yt+1−K2−Dεt+1) = K1+AC−1 (yt −K2−Dεt)+Bεt , (3.39)
yt+1−CAC−1yt = CK1+K2−CAC−1K2+(CB−CAC−1D)εt +Dεt+1 .
Therefore, we obtain a VARMA(1,1) representation of yt :
yt = K4+CAC−1yt−1+
(
I+(CBD−1−CAC−1)L)ut . (3.40)
with ut ∼ N(0,DD′).
Appendix: Estimation Algorithms
Two-Stage Least Squares and Iterative Least Squares
These two methods are computationally very easy to implement. The iterative least squares
method has been introduced by Kapetanios (2003).
We discuss the methods in the framework of a standard VARMA (p,q) representation
yt = A1yt−1+ . . .+Apyt−p+ut +M1ut−1+ . . .+Mqut−q . (3.41)
Usually additional restrictions need to be imposed on the coefficient matrices to ensure
identification of the parameters.
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Given that the moving-average polynomial is invertible, there exists an infinite VAR
representation of the process, yt =∑∞i=1 Πiyt−i+ut . In the first step of both algorithms, this
representation is approximated by a “long” VAR to get an estimate of the residuals. More
precisely, the following regression equation is used
yt =
nT
∑
i=1
Πiyt−i+ut , (3.42)
where nT is large and goes to infinity as the sample size grows. The estimated residuals
are denoted by uˆ(0)t . Given these estimates, we might obtain estimates of the parameter
matrices by performing a (restricted) regression in
yt = A1yt−1+ . . .+Apyt−p+ut +M1uˆ
(0)
t−1+ . . .+Mquˆ
(0)
t−q . (3.43)
Denote the estimated coefficient matrices by A(1)1 ,A
(1)
2 , . . . ,A
(1)
p and M
(1)
1 ,M
(1)
2 , . . . ,M
(1)
q .
These estimates are the final estimates of the two-stage least squares method. These initial
parameter estimates can be used to obtain a new estimate of the residuals. Denote by
Uˆ (1) the vector collecting the estimated new residuals. We can then use Uˆ (1) again in the
above equation to obtain new estimates of the coefficient matrices. Denote the vector of
estimated residuals at the ith iteration by Uˆ (i). Kapetanios (2003) proposes to iterate least
squares regressions until ||U (i−1)−Uˆ (i)||< c, according to some pre-specified number c.
Hannan-Kavalieris Method
This method goes originally back to Durbin (1960) and has been introduced by Hannan
and Kavalieris (1984) for multivariate processes.10 It is a Gauss-Newton procedure to
maximize the likelihood function conditional on yt = 0, ut = 0 for t ≤ 0, but its first iter-
10See also Hannan and Deistler (1988), sections 6.5, 6.7, for an extensive discussion.
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ation has been sometimes interpreted as a three-stage least squares procedure (Dufour and
Pelletier (2002)). We discuss also this method in the framework of a standard VARMA
(p,q) representation
yt = A1yt−1+ . . .+Apyt−p+ut +M1ut−1+ . . .+Mqut−q . (3.44)
To consider zero restrictions, we use the following notation. The vector of all parameters
is denoted by β = vec[A1, . . . , Ap, M1, . . .Mq]. The vector of free parameters, γ, can be
defined by introducing a restriction matrix R such that the vectors are related by β = Rγ.
Given that the moving-average polynomial is invertible, there exists an infinite VAR
representation of the process, yt = ∑∞i=1 Πiyt−i + ut . In the first step of the algorithm, this
representation is approximated by a “long” VAR to get an estimate of the residuals. More
precisely, the following regression equation is used
yt =
nT
∑
i=1
Πiyt−i+ut , (3.45)
where nT is large and goes to infinity as the sample size grows. Given an estimate of
the residuals, uˆt , we might obtain starting values for future iterations by performing a (re-
stricted) regression in
yt = A1yt−1+ . . .+Apyt−p+ut +M1uˆt−1+ . . .+Mquˆt−q . (3.46)
Denote the estimated coefficient matrices by A˜1, A˜2, . . . , A˜p and M˜1,M˜2, . . . ,M˜q. The first
iteration of the conditional maximum likelihood algorithm can be expressed in a simple
regression framework. One forms new residuals, εt , and new matrices, ξt , ηt and Xˆt , ac-
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cording to
εt = yt −
p
∑
j=1
A˜ jyt− j−
q
∑
j=1
M˜ jεt− j , (3.47a)
ξt = −
q
∑
j=1
M˜ jξt− j + εt , (3.47b)
ηt = −
q
∑
j=1
M˜ jηt− j + yt , (3.47c)
Xˆt = −
q
∑
j=1
M˜ jXˆt− j +(Y ′t ⊗ IK)R , (3.47d)
for t = 1,2, . . . ,T , Yt = [y′t , . . . ,y′t−p+1, uˆ
′
t , . . . , uˆ
′
t−q+1]
′ and yt = εt = ξt = ηt = 0 and Xˆt = 0
for t ≤ 0. The final estimate is
γˆ =
(
T
∑
m+1
Xˆ ′t−1Σ̂
−1
t Xˆt−1
)−1( T
∑
m+1
Xˆt−1Σ̂−1(εt +ηt −ξt)
)
, (3.48)
where Σ̂ = T−1 ∑εtε′t , m = max{p,q}. This procedure is asymptotically efficient under
certain conditions (Lu¨tkepohl (2005)).
Subspace Algorithms
Subspace algorithms rely on the state space representation of a linear system. The CCA
algorithm is originally due to Larimore (1983). The basic idea behind subspace algorithms
lies in the fact that if we knew the unobserved state, xt , we could estimate the system
matrices, A, K,C, by linear regressions as can be seen from the basic equations
xt+1 = Axt +Kut , (3.49a)
yt = Cxt +ut . (3.49b)
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Given the state and the observations, Cˆ and uˆt could be obtained by a regression of yt on xt
and Aˆ and Kˆ could be obtained by a regression of xt+1 on xt and uˆt . Therefore, the problem
is to obtain in a first step an estimate of the n-dimensional state, xˆt . This is analogous to the
idea of a long autoregression in VARMA models that estimates the unobserved residuals in
a first step which is followed by a least squares regression.
Solving the state space equations, one can express the state as a function of past obser-
vations of yt and an initial state for some integer p> 0 as
xt = (A−KC)pxt−p+
p−1
∑
i=0
(A−KC)iKyt−i−1,
= (A−KC)pxt−p+KpY−t,p , (3.50)
where Kp = [K,(A−KC)K, . . . ,(A−KC)p−1K] and Y−t,p = [y′t−1, . . . ,y′t−p]′. On the other
hand, one can express future observations as a function of the current state and future noise
as
yt+ j = CA jxt +
j−1
∑
i=0
CAiKut+ j−i−1+ut+ j , (3.51)
for j = 1,2, . . .. Therefore, at each t, the best predictor of yt+ j is a function of the current
state only, CA jxt , and thus the state summarizes in this sense all relevant information in the
past up to time t.
Define Y+t, f = [y
′
t , . . . ,y
′
t+ f−1]
′ for some integer f > 0 and formulate equation (3.51) for
all observations contained in Y+t, f simultaneously. Combine these equations with (3.50) in
order to obtain
Y+t, f = O f KpY
−
t,p+O f (A−BC)pxt−p+E f E+t, f , (3.52)
where O f = [C′,A′C′, . . . ,(A f−1)′C′]′, E+t, f = [u
′
t , . . . ,u
′
t+ f−1]
′ and E f is a function of the
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system matrices. The above equation is central for most subspace algorithms. Note that
if the maximum eigenvalue of (A−KC) is less than one in absolute value, we have (A−
KC)p ≈ 0 for large p. This condition is satisfied for stationary and invertible processes.
This reasoning motivates an approximation of the above equation by
Y+t, f = βY
−
t,p+N
+
t, f , (3.53)
where β = O f Kp and N+t, f is defined by the equation. Most popular subspace algorithms
use this equation to obtain an estimate of β that is decomposed into O f and Kp. The
identification problem is solved implicitly during this step.
For given integers, n, p, f , the employed algorithm consists of the following steps:
1. Set up Y+t, f and Y
−
t,p and perform OLS in (3.53) using the available data to get an
estimate βˆ f ,p.
2. Compute the sample covariances
Γˆ+f =
1
Tf ,p
T− f+1
∑
t=p+1
Y+t, f (Y
+
t, f )
′ , Γˆ−p =
1
Tf ,p
T− f+1
∑
t=p+1
Y−t,p(Y
−
t,p)
′,
where Tf ,p = T − f −p+1.
3. Given the dimension of the state, n, compute the singular value decomposition
(Γˆ+f )
−1/2βˆ f ,p(Γˆ−p )
1/2 = UˆnΣˆnVˆ ′n+ Rˆn,
where Σˆn is a diagonal matrix that contains the n largest singular values and Uˆn and Vˆn
are the corresponding singular vectors. The remaining singular values are neglected
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and the approximation error is Rˆn. The reduced rank matrices are obtained as
Oˆ f Kˆp = [(Γˆ+f )
1/2UˆnΣˆ
1/2
n ][Σˆ
1/2
n Vˆ ′n(Γˆ
−
p )
−1/2].
4. Estimate the state as xˆt = KˆpY−t,p and estimate the system matrices using linear re-
gressions as described above.
Although the algorithm looks quite complicated at first sight, it is actually very simple
and is regarded to lead to numerically stable and accurate estimates. There are certain
parameters which have to be determined prior to estimation, namely the dimension of the
state and the integers f and p. See the text for the employed values. For the asymptotic
consequences of various choices see Bauer (2005).
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Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Benchmark Calibrations and Time Series Properties
Parameters Common CKM-specification KP-specification
α 0.33
β 0.981/4
σ 1
δ 1− (1−0.6)1/4
ψ 2.5
γ 1.011/4−1
µ 0.00516
L¯ 1
τ¯l 0.243
τx 0.3
ρ 0.94 0.993
στ 0.008 0.0066
σx 0.00568 0.011738
Selected time series properties
eig(A1) 0.9573, 0.9400 0.9573, 0.9930
eig(M1) −0.9557, 0 −0.9505, 0
eig(K) −1.7779±0.51i −2.0298±0.35i
Parameter values of the CKM and KP benchmark calibrations. The last three rows display some
properties of the implied VARMA and state space representation. eig(A1) and eig(M1) denote the
eigenvalues of the autoregressive and the moving-average matrix, respectively. eig(K) denotes the
eigenvalues of the matrix K in the state space model in innovations form.
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KP-Specification
Figure 3.1: Mean impulse response (- -), true impulse response (–) and 95% intervals of
hours worked to one standard deviation shock to technology for the VAR and the CCA
subspace algorithm.
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CKM-Specification
Figure 3.2: Mean impulse response (- -), true impulse response (–) and 95% intervals of
hours worked to one standard deviation shock to technology for the VAR and the CCA
subspace algorithm.
